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INTRODUCTION
Since 1929, an international air carrier's liability for personal and
cargo injury and damage has been governed by the Warsaw Conven-
tion ("Convention"), officially referred to as the Convention .for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air.' The Convention is a comprehensive international treaty
governing the liability of carriers in "all international transportation
of persons, baggage and goods."2 The Convention emerged due to
differences among the world's countries as to liability rules govern-
ing air transportation accidents.' The parties to the Convention de-
sired to limit a carrier's liability in the event of any catastrophic air-
craft disasters which might otherwise threaten the financial security
of the infant industry.' Other objectives were to achieve uniformity in
an air carrier's liability and documentation for transportation, to
avoid involved conflicts of law problems, protect the fledgling inter-
national transportation business, and to facilitate transactions be-
tween countries around the world.
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 449 U.S.C. § 1502 (1998) (adherence of United States
proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The various instru-
ments comprising the Warsaw Convention are reprinted and collected in the Inter-
national Air Transport Association's ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
AIR CARRIER LIABILITY (1999) [hereinafter IATA, AVIATION DOCUMENTS].
2. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
3. See id. pmbl.; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan 1. Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497-99 (1967) (not-
ing the intention of the Warsaw Convention to create, among other things, uniform
regulations regarding liability of air carriers).
4. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99 (discussing the
relative youth of the airline industry and the goal of the Warsaw Convention to
limit air carrier liability in instances involving accidents).
5. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, pmble. (relating the aims of the
Warsaw Convention); see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99
(discussing the goals of the Warsaw Convention).
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Since the Convention's inception, various issues have emerged re-
garding the scope and interpretation of the Convention, especially in
light of the modernization and expansion of air travel. As a result, the
Convention has recently undergone significant changes and reform
efforts aimed at modernizing the liability scheme. The traditionally
low liability limits have been raised, converted into an international
market standard, and tied to inflation. The concept of willful miscon-
duct to break the monetary limits has been eliminated with an essen-
tially no-fault based system in place for damage claims under the
new and higher limits, with a pure fault based system for claims over
the established limits. The reforms also have introduced notions of
up-front payments, arbitration, and mandatory insurance as well as
expanded the possible forums to assert claims.
Despite these changes, however, the fundamental standard of li-
ability for death and injury claims under Article 17 remains un-
changed. Since the initial elimination of the international carrier's
due diligence defense, beginning in 1966, the meaning and intent of
"accident" has been under great strain. Moreover, it is now clear that
the Convention provides the exclusive remedy for claims arising out
of international air travel. This has further intensified the debate over
the scope and meaning of Article 17, especially as to altercations by
and among passengers and flight crew, and other similar disturbances
or incidents arising out of modern air travel.
This Article overviews the history and origin of the Warsaw Con-
vention as it relates to carrier liability for passenger disturbances.
This Article examines the evolution of the liability scheme, together
with decisional law interpreting and applying Article 17, and the
Convention's exclusivity to international air travel claims. This Arti-
cle suggests that courts have interpreted and applied the "accident"
requirement of Article 17 too broadly and contrary to the drafters'
intentions, especially as to incidents of passenger misconduct. It is
argued that the modern reform efforts have so far failed to include
Article 17 within their purview, and that they must do so in order to
truly modernize an international air carrier's liability. This Article
further asserts that the interpretational problems with "accident," vis-
A-vis passenger upon passenger misconduct, raise the more funda-
mental question of whether there is any need for monetary limits or
wholesale elimination of fault based principles for all international
aviation claims.
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I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A. PASSENGER DISTURBANCES
Modem air travel is both convenient and relatively inexpensive,
allowing more passengers to travel to more places then ever before.'
Moreover, air travel is now a routine and fundamental aspect of
modem life. One result of this growth is that in-flight disturbances by
and between passengers and/or flight crew have become increasingly
7common.
In-flight disturbances range in degree and character.' The panoply
of altercations encompass physical fights or confrontations, sexual
assaults, injurious contact, or verbal harassment by and between pas-
sengers, or passengers and flight crew members. 9 Others include re-
fusals to obey simple commands or instructions of the flight crew.
Some of the reported incidents include:
6. See Suzi T. Collins & John Scott Hoff, In Flight Incivility Today: The Un-
ruly Passenger, 12 AIR & SPACE L. 23, 23 (1998) (stating that "[m]ost airlines
have reconfigured their aircraft to fit as many passengers as possible to increase
their seat revenues per flight mile"); see also World Airline Passenger Traffic
Growth Pick Up Through to 2001, at http://www.icao.org/icao/en/nr/pio9909.htm
(last visited Feb. 9, 2001) (noting the International Civil Aviation Organization's
("ICAO") statistics and estimates for total international and domestic passenger
traffic, including 2,630 billion passenger-kilometers in 1998, 2,739 billion in 1999,
2,875 billion in 2000, and 3,038 billion in 2001).
7. See Collins & Hoff, supra note 6, at 23 (noting the rise of disturbances that
have taken place on airplanes during the course of air travel).
8. See Jeff MacGregor, The Way We Live Now: 9-24-00; Flv the Angry Skies,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 21 (discussing some of the differ-
ent disturbances that have occurred during commercial airline flights); see also
Feds Are Getting Tough on Unruly Airline Passenger, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 10,
1997, at A16, available at 1997 WL 15241024 (discussing a survey by the Air
Transport Association ("ATP") finding that twenty-five percent of air rage inci-
dents were fueled by alcohol, sixteen percent concerned seat assignments, ten per-
cent of incidents related to smoking, nine percent involved carry-on baggage, eight
percent of incidents related to attitude problems, and five percent of airline inci-
dents centered around food service).
9. See Donald B. Cotton, Interference with Crew Members in the Per brn-
ance of their Duties, Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular No. 120-
65 (1996), available at www.faa.gov/avr/afs/cabin.htm; see generally AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, PASSENGER MISCONDUCT: A GUIDE TO PROSECUTING
CRIMES AGAINST AIRLINES PERSONNEL AND PASSENGERS (2000), available at
www.airtransport.org/public/publications/74.asp.
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o a sleeping passenger wakes up to another passenger unbutton-
ing her pants and fondling her private parts:'
o a passenger assaults flight attendant and tries to enter cockpit
after becoming enraged when told he was whistling too
loudly;"
" a passenger momentarily grabs another passenger's private
parts based on mistaken identity '2
o a fist fight between two passengers:
o a drunken passenger falls on another passenger:
o a passenger injures another passenger by suddenly moving his
seat or dropping an item from overhead compartments;
10. See Wallace v. Korean Airlines, Inc., 214 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 20001),
cert. denied, 2001 U.S. Lexis 1113 (U.S. Feb. 20. 2001) (holding that a sexual as-
sault while on an airplane was to be considered an "accident" under the rules of the
Warsaw Convention, thus subjecting the carrier to potential liability); see also
Tsevas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 97 C 0320. 1997 WL 767278, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 1, 1997) (holding that the unsolicited sexual advances of one intoxicated pas-
senger upon another passenger comprised an accident within the terms of the War-
saw Convention).
11. See Officials Seek to Prevent Air Rage: Erperts on Security Echange
Ideas During DFW Airport Meeting, FORT WORTH STAR-T-LI-LURAM, Sept. 20,
2000, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library, FWSTEL File (discussing incidents
of air rage).
12. See Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc.. 199 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 20001)
(reversing a lower court's dismissal of a claim brought by a passenger w ho as-
serted that he was momentarily grabbed in the private area by another passenger ).
13. See Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Cir. 4947 (JFK). 1992 WL 1701679, at
**1-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1992) (granting defendant's summary judgment motion
where plaintiff, who was intoxicated, was assaulted in the aircraft and sought to
hold the defendant liable under Warsaw Convention): see also Stone v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Haw. 1995) (holding that an assault that
occurred between two passengers did not qualif,, as an "accident," thereby result-
ing in airline liability under the terms of the Warsaw Convention because it "'was
not an accident derived from air travel.").
14. See Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) para. 18,283-
25 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 1983) (dismissing a plaintiff's claim that he was allegedly in-
jured on an airline flight when an intoxicated passenger fell on the him because,
although the incident was an accident under the terms of the Warsaw Convention,
the claim was barred by the statute of limitations).
15. See Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881. 883-84 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a passenger who sought to hold an airline liable for injuries she suf-
fered as she attempted to avoid contact with another passenger's seat failed to sup-
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o a verbal and/or physical confrontation between crew member
and passenger over seat assignment; 16
" a routine but offensive search of a passenger prior to board-
ing;'1
" a flight attendant pushes a passenger into a seat to clear the
aisle;'"
o a flight crew member forcefully removes a passenger from the
lavatory due to a smoke alarm sounding;' 9
o a passenger assaults and intimidates flight attendant after being
denied a request for pillow or blanket;2"
o a passenger refuses to turn off boom box;2' and
port her claim of an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention because a reclined
seat was not considered an unusual event on an airplane); see also Gotz v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that a passenger
who injured himself by placing a bag in an over-head compartment while seeking
to avoid injuring another passenger failed to support his claim for airline liability
for an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention because the incident was not
within the airline's control); Maxwell v. Aer Lingus, 122 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.
Mass. 2000) (holding that liquor bottles which dislodge from overhead bin and
strike passenger on head is an accident)
16. See Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170-71 (D. Or.
1999) (holding that a physical and verbal confrontation between a passenger and a
flight attendant over seating assignments was governed by the Warsaw Convention
and was considered an accident under the Convention).
17. See El Al Israel Airlines, LTD v. Tseng Yuan Tsui, 525 U.S. 155 (1999)
(considering the liability of an airline where an "intrusive security search" con-
ducted by airline security before the passenger boarded plane inflicted the passen-
ger with psychological harm).
18. See Brandt v. American Airlines, No. C 98-2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2000) (dismissing plaintiffs claim that airline personnel's
act of pushing plaintiff into his seat constituted grounds for airline liability as an
accident under the terms of the Warsaw Convention).
19. See Laor v. Air France, 31 F. Supp. 2d 347, 349-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that the plaintiff's claim of being forcibly removed from an airplane
lavatory by airline personnel was considered an accident under the Warsaw Con-
vention, but that the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was barred by the Con-
vention).
20. See United States v. Flores, 968 F.2d 1366, 1368 (1st Cir. 1992) (assessing
liability when a passenger assaulted a flight attendant during a dispute concerning
the passenger's rude behavior).
21. See United States v. Hicks, 980 F.2d 963, 972, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the charge of intimidating an airline's flight crew was not unconstitu-
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o a passenger refuses to extinguish cigarette.:
These incidents, as well as other related modem day events such
as in-flight health crises, diversions, passenger removals, security
searches and arrests, pose conflicts under the Warsaw scheme. It is
not immediately apparent whether the Convention's liability scheme
was meant to cover such events, especially passenger upon passenger
assaults or torts. Courts are currently conflicted, with a growing
number finding such confrontations to invoke carrier liability under
the Convention.2 Upon deeper inquiry, however, substantial ques-
tions are raised as to whether the Convention was ever meant to
cover such disputes.
B. THE WARSAW INSTRUMENTS AND LIABILITY SCHEME
The Warsaw Convention was the product of international confer-
ences held in 1925 and 1929.24 At the 1929 conference, the Comit,
International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Ariens (C.I.T.E.J.A.),
a committee of government selected experts previously appointed to
establish a set of rules for international air carriage, presented a draft
convention.-5 Underlying this draft were the principles upon which
the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention were founded. Ac-
tionally vague and that there was sufficient evidence of intimidation wvhere a pas-
senger refused to discontinue the use of his boombox despite repeated requests to
do so).
22. See Choukroun v. American Airlines. Inc.. No. 98-12557-NG (D. Mass.
Aug. 2, 2000) (order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
23. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. \. Tseng Yuan Tsui. 525 U.S. 155, 160
(1999) (suggesting that an intrusive routine security search can be interpreted as an
accident under the Warsaw Convention); see also Wallace \. Korean Airlines, 214
F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a sexual assault by one passenger upon
another is an accident under the rules of the Warsaw Convention); Lahey v. Singa-
pore Airlines, Ltd., 115 F. Supp. 2d 464. 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an
assault on one passenger by another was considered an accident under the Warsawv
Convention); Goodwin v. Air France, No. C97-1997 FMS, 1998 WL 296356, at * I
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 1998) (holding that an attack by a passenger on another passen-
ger can be deemed an accident under the terms of the Warsaw Convention).
24. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498 (providing the back-
ground of the Warsaw Convention).
25. See John J. Ide, The Histor" and .ccoinplishmtent of the International
Technical Committee of Aerial Legal £&perts (C.I.TEJ.4., 3 J. AIR L. & CoU.
27, 32, 36 (1932) (describing the work of the CITEJA on the Warsaw Convention).
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cording to the Rapporteur of the 1925 Conference:
[t]he Commission asked itself which liability regime had to be adopted:
risk or fault. The general feeling is that, whilst liability towards third par-
ties must see the application of the risk theory, by contrast, in the matter
of the carrier's liability in relation to passengers and goods, one must ad-
26
mit the fault theory.
Further, the Convention's formation involved the convergence of
principles of carrier liability under both the civil and common law
systems. Under common law, the carrier is subjected to a heightened
duty of care. While not absolute, it requires the carrier "to use the
greatest amount of care and foresight which is reasonably neces-
sary' ' 17 under the circumstances. Thus, failure to exercise this care is
negligent. Carriers are not liable for the assaults or torts of third par-
ties absent notice and failure to protect the injured passenger.2" In
contrast, under the civil law system, a carrier's duty to passengers is
a strict contractual duty to safely transport. 9 The only exception to
this contractual liability is if the damage or loss is due to a cause that
is not attributable to the carrier.30 Under the principle of force ma-
jeure, a carrier is not liable for loss or damage if the occurrence is
unforeseeable, insuperable, and extraneous to the carrier's business
and activities,3' and includes "fait ou faute d'un tiers" (act or fault of
26. See GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT:
THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 63 (1977) (quoting Conference ln-
ternationale (Paris, 1925) Rapport Pittard Annexes, p. 60).
27. Id. at 52.
28. See Milone v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 91 F.3d 229, 231
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. O'Neill, 633
A.2d 834, 840 (D.C. 1993)) (holding that a common carrier "has a duty to protect
its passengers from foreseeable harm arising from criminal conduct of others.");
see also Kelley v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 37 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding that a railroad is not liable for assault of a passenger by an em-
ployee unless it is proven that the railroad "knew or should have known the assail-
ant was the type of person who might commit an assault.").
29. See MILLER, supra note 26, at 54 (describing the presence of a contractual
duty to transport goods and passengers safely under French law).
30. See id. (describing the exception to contractual liability, "cause 6trang~re,"
under the Civil Code).
31. See id. at 54-55 (listing instances where a carrier is not liable for failing to
deliver passengers and goods safely under the concept of force majeure in French
[ 16:891
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a third party) so long as all three conditions are met." Accordingly,
carriers were not absolutely liable for injuries or damage caused to
passengers by other passengers under either system of liability.
A primary and fundamental purpose of the Convention was to es-
tablish uniform rules governing claims arising out of international air
transportation and limit the liability of air carriers." At the time, the
air transportation industry was in its infancy,' and there were sub-
stantial differences among the world's countries as to liability rules
governing air transportation accidents." Many countries' civil laws
allowed carriers to contractually (i.e. by ticket) disclaim liability for
injury or death.36 Importantly, while uniformity was an essential goal
to the Convention, the objectives also included the desire to protect
the fledgling air transportation business from disaster. " The primary
concern was air accidents, such as crashes or other large-scale inci-
dents in the plane's operation, which could lead to disastrous finan-
law).
32. See id. at 55 n.41 (noting the requirement that all three conditions must be
met in order for liability to be excluded in situations in% ol ing "'fait ou faute d'un
tiers").
33. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462. 1467 (1 lth Cir. 1989)
(discussing the background of the Warsaw Convention and its aims); Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99 (outlining the drafter's goals for the Warsaw
Convention).
34. See 1 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACcIDENT L.%, sec. 10.01[2], at 10-6
(Blanca I. Rodriguez ed., 1996) (describing the state of the a% iation industry in
1929); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3. at 498 icharacterizing the a%,iation
industry as being on the verge of becoming a common mode of transportation).
35. See 1 STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE. AvIATION TORT L ,,
§11.4, at 635-36 (1978 & Supp. 1999) (stating the twin goals of the Conention to
be establishing uniformity in law and limiting the liability of air carrers in acci-
dents).
36. See HUIBERT DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTLRN XTIu\ XL AIR
LAW 1-11 (1954) (discussing limitations on liability in ci\il a\ iation law ).
37. See generally Jonathan L. Neville, The International .4ir Transportation
Association's Attempt to Modifi International Air Disaster Liabilt . In Admirable
Effort with an Impossible Goal, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 571, 573-74 (1999)
(citing Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention: Cutting the Gorthan Knot and the
1995 Intercarrier Agreement, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CuM. 67, 68-69 t1996))
(noting the problem that liability posed to the relatively young airline industry in
the event of an airline disaster).
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cial consequences." There was also the concern that insurance would
otherwise become too expensive for carriers, and tickets too costly
for most passengers. At the time, the air carrier industry was finan-
cially weak and faced possible, if not inevitable, bankruptcy from a
single disaster. 9 It was crucial for the Convention to limit air carrier
liability and allow the air transportation industry to grow and obtain
the necessary capital by placing uniform limits on possible disastrous
claims. 40 This could be done by identifying, at the outset, what liabil-
ity the carrier could incur.'
38. See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971) (dis-
cussing the aims of the Warsaw Convention, particularly preventing liability
claims from severely harming air carriers in the event of a disastrous accident); see
also James N. Fincher, Watching Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention
Fly Away, and the 1ATA Initiative, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW 309, 310 (1997) (noting
the concerns surrounding the potential financial ramifications that an air disaster
could have had on the airline industry); cf Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
3, at 499 (observing that the Warsaw Convention's aim of establishing liability
ceilings was an effort to attract capital to the airline industry).
39. See generally KREINDLER, supra note 34, sec. 10.01[2], at 10-6 (citing
Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1978)) (dis-
cussing early issues and problems with the aviation industry).
40. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-500 (maintaining that a
central goal of the Convention was to uniformly restrict the potential liability of
the airline in the event of passenger injuries or fatalities); see also D. GOEDVHUIS,
NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 136 (Martinus Ni-
jhoff ed., 1937) (stressing that the airliners' motive to enter into the Convention
was in limiting their own liability). Moreover, the airliners sought to exclude do-
mestic flights, non-commercial flights, and "carriages performed not for reward by
individuals or groups" from the Convention altogether. Id. at 142; KRIENDLER, su-
pra note 34, sec. 11.01[2] n.4 (citing Dunn, 589 F.2d at 410-11) (providing the ex-
ample of Dunn, a federal case in which the defendant airline was forced to pay a
substantial penalty to an injured passenger). Airlines were fully aware of the possi-
bility that a major lawsuit could destroy capital investment, and thus sought to
limit their potential liability through the Convention. See KRIENDLER, supra note
34, sec. 11.01[2] n.4.
41. See Ide, supra note 25, at 30 (citing Report of 1925 International Confer-
ence of Private Air Law) (reporting the establishment of two commissions by the
First International Conference of Private Air Law in 1925, created to report on
general questions of private air law and the liability of air carriers); see also An-
drea Buff, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the Warsaw Convention: Does the
IA TA Intercarrier Agreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the Convention?, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1768, 1774 n.42 (1997) (citing Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, Message from the President of the U.S. Transmitting a Convention /br
the Unification of Certain Rules, S. EXEC. DOc. NO. G., 73d Cong., at 3-4 (2d
Sess. 1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Aviation Rep. 239, 242) (contending that lim-
900 [16:891
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Also underlying the Convention's goal of limiting a carrier's li-
ability was the understanding that liability of the air carrier would be
"less rigorous" than that for other carriersz and that the carrier was
not assuming responsibility for the safety of the passenger absent
fault. It was also understood and intended that the carrier would not
assume responsibility for risks associated with travel in general'
Reduced to its essentials, the Convention's limited liability scheme
imposed presumed liability upon the carrier for injury resulting from
aviation accidents by setting monetary limits to any damage recov-
ery, and allowing exoneration where the carrier exercised due dili-
gence." Since the Convention was imposing liability upon the carrier
for aircraft accidents, it placed the burden of proof regarding due
diligence on the carrier, as it was believed that, in most crashes or
major incidents, the carrier would be the most knowledgeable as to
cause.4 1 If the cause could not be determined, then the carrier would
ited liability would attract investors and insurance underwriters to the airline in-
dustry); GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 243 (explaining that the purpose of the War-
saw Convention was to give carriers the advantage of knowing when and to what
extent their liability would be engaged).
42. See GOEDHUtS, supra note 40, at 233, 236 (stating that the "[the liability of
the air carrier must be submitted to rules less rigorous than those imposed on other
carriers.").
43. See id. (justifying the "less rigorous" enforcement of airline liabilty with
the belief among representatives at the Convention that airline passengers, unlike
passengers traveling on the more traditional modes of transportation, accepted the
increased risks accompanied with flying). The argument for decreased airline l-
ability was further strengthened by the contention that an airline could not over-
come a presumption of fault where the airplane is involved in an accident, or dis-
appears in the sea. See id. at 237, MILLER, supra note 26, at 63 (admitting that
"anyone using an aircraft does not ignore the risks inherent in a mode of transpor-
tation which has not yet reached the point of perfection that one hundred years
have given to the railways.").
44. See GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 38 (explaining that "a system of liability
must be arrived to which the injured party is relieved from the burden of proof
without this resulting in declaring the carrier liable when it has committed no
fault.").
45. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW AFFELTIN\ AIR
QUESTIONS, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONALTICAL
LAW, MINUTES, OCT. 4-12, WARSAW 1929, at 21. 37. 252 (R. Homer ed. & D. Le-
grez transl., 1975) [hereinafter 1929 WARSAW MINUTES] (noting that a showing of
due diligence will lessen the extent to which the air carrier would be liable);
GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 217-18, 230 (discussing the generally accepted rule of
placing the burden of proof on the carrier).
2001]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
be liable.46 Indeed, it was the placement of the burden of proof on the
carrier that served as the justification for modest liability limits.
Based on these notions, the Warsaw liability scheme that emerged
in 1929 allowed a passenger to recover damages for any injury or
death if the following were established: "(a) the claimant was a pas-
senger of an international flight; 7 (b) the claimant suffered an 'acci-
dent;' 48 (c) the accident occurred aboard the international flight or in
the course of embarking or disembarking the international flight; "
and (d) the accident caused the passenger to suffer "death or
wounding. . . or any other bodily injury."' The two primary de-
fenses were contributory negligence on the part of the claimant and
carrier exoneration where it undertook "all necessary measures" to
avoid the accident.5' Finally, the monetary limit could be broken by
showing that the carrier engaged in "willful misconduct,"" or where
the carrier failed to deliver the ticket." The monetary limit was
125,000 francs (approximately $8,300 in U. S. currency)." Although
the Convention barred carriers from undermining the Convention
rules by exculpatory contract language, carriers could agree to a
higher limit of liability with the passenger "by special contract.""
Since its inception, a number of modifications or supplements to
the Convention have attempted to address and raise the liability lim-
its.56 These modifications include the 1955 Hague Protocol," the
46. See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED:
A LEGAL HANDBOOK (Kluwer 2000) (providing a translation and analytical com-
mentary for the Warsaw Convention).
47. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17.
48. See id. art. 17.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Seeid. art. 20(1).
52. See Warsaw Convention, supra note I, art. 25.
53. See id. art. 22.
54. See id.
55. See id. art. 22(l).
56. See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text (delineating the several
multilateral and unilateral attempts to increase liability limits).
57. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
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1966 Montreal Interim Agreement,5' the 1971 Guatemala City Proto-
col, 9 the Supplemental Guadalajara Convention of 1961," ' the 1975
Montreal Protocols,6' and the more recent 1999 Montreal Conven-
tion.62 Moreover, there have been unilateral efforts to modify the li-
ability scheme. These primarily include the Japanese Initiative of
1992,63 the European Community Regulation:j and the IATA Inter-
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, Sept.
28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter The Hague Protocol].
58. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol (1966), Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, ap-
proved by Exec. Order No. 23,680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966) [hereinafter Mont-
real Interim Agreement], reprinted in IATA. AVIATION DOCUMENTS, supra note I,
at 139.
59. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Mar. 8. 1971
[hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol), reprinted in IATA, PRINCIPAL
INSTRUMENTS OF THE WARSAW SYSTEM 3-47 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter PRINCIPAL
INSTRUMENTS].
60. Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, For the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person
Other than the Contracting Carrier, reprinted in PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 59, at 58-60.
61. Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12
Oct. 1929, Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENT'S, supra note 59, at
48-50; Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12
Oct. 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Sept.
25, 1975, reprinted in PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 59, at 51-53; Addi-
tional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929
as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955 and at Guatemala
City on 8 Mar. 1971, Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 59, at 54-57; Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at War-
saw on 12 Oct. 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept.
1955, Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4]. reprinted in PRINCIPAL
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 59, at 2-47.
62. Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carnage
by Air, opened for signature on 28 May 1999, available at
http://www.dot.gov/ot/ogc/Convention.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2001) [hereinafter
Montreal Convention 1999], reprinted in IATA, AVIATION DOCUMENrS, supra
note 1, at 17.
63. See Nanaeen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention,
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carrier Agreements.
65
The Hague Protocol doubled the liability limits to 250,000 francs
(approximately $16,600 in U. S. currency).6" It also added a provision
allowing recovery of litigation expenses according to local law and
defining "willful misconduct" to mean intentional or reckless acts
causing injury or death.67 Although the Montreal Interim Agreement
61 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 453-56 (1996) (discussing Japanese airliners' agreement
to abandon liability limits imposed by the Warsaw Convention). This initiative
preceded the modern IATA Agreements and the Montreal Convention of 1999. See
id. It constitutes an agreement among ten Japanese carriers to establish a two-tiered
liability scheme with absolute liability of up to 100,000 SDRs and presumed li-
ability for damages in excess of this limit. See id. A major impetus behind this
agreement was the 1985 crash of a Japanese Airline, which killed five-hundred
twenty-nine people. See id.; Bin Cheng, Air Carriers' Liability for Passenger In-
jury and Death: The Japanese Initiative and Response to the Recent EC Consulta-
tion Paper, 18 AIR & SPACE L. 109 (1993) (discussing the importance and circum-
stances of the Japanese initiative).
64. See Council Regulation 2027/97, 40 O.J. (L 285) 1 [hereinafter EC Regu-
lation]; see also Berend Crans & Onno Rijsdijk, EC Aviation Scene, 21 AIR &
SPACE L. 193 (1996) (reviewing the EC Regulation in the context of the European
Community). The EC Regulation resulted from the Commission of the European
Union's concern over the voluntary nature of the IATA initiative. See Crans &
Rijsdijk, supra. The EC Regulation not only set forth a two-tiered liability system
like the IATA and Japanese initiative, but also provided that it was mandatory for
all European Union countries and required up-front payments to the family of a
victim in case of death. See EC Regulation, supra. In The Queen v. The Secretar,
of State For the Environment, Transport and the Regions, the regulation was chal-
lenged before the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom as constituting an
impermissible change to the Warsaw Convention without the consent of the sig-
natory states. The Court held that the Regulation in suspense because it conflicts
"with the Warsaw Convention and impedes the performance by member states
who are parties to it." 1 Lloyd's Rep. 242 (Apr. 21, 1999).
65. See IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA), available at
http://www.iata.org/legal/listintercarrier.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2001) [herein-
after IIA], reprinted in IATA, AVIATION DOCUMENTS, supra note I, at 51; Agree-
ment on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA), avail-
able at http://www.iata.org/legal/listintercarrier.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2001),
reprinted in IATA, AVIATION DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 55.
66. See The Hague Protocol, supra note 57, art. XI.
67. See id. art. XIII. The United States did not adopt The Hague Protocol due
to its continued dissatisfaction with the amount of the Protocol's limits. See Mat-
thew R. Pickelman, Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for In-
ternational Carriage by Air: The Warsaw Convention Revisited for the Last Time,
64 J. AIR L. & COMM. 274, 284 (1998).
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followed in 1966,6' the United States expressed dissatisfaction with
the amount of the liability limits and threatened to denounce the
Convention.69 The United States sought limits of S100.000 per pas-
senger, an amount that other countries felt to be excessive. The two
sides finally reached a "compromise," establishing a limit of $75,000
per passenger, including litigation expenses." In addition, the com-
promise waived the "all necessary measures" defense provided by
Article 20, and included notice of the new limits on airline tickets.
Thus, the agreement was a contract between carriers and passengers
whose tickets have points of departure, destination or an agreed
stopping place in the United States.';
In 1971, the liability limits were again at issue when a convention
was held in Guatemala City. The resulting Guatemala City Protocol
of 197 14 proposed amendments to the Warsaw Scheme which in-
cluded the following: (a) an increase in the liability limits to ap-
proximately $100,000;7 (b) absolute liability for injury or death up to
the $100,000 limit which could not be overcome by a showing of
willful misconduct;" (c) recovery of litigation costs including attor-
neys' fees, if allowed for by the national law and if the air carrier re-
68. One intervening convention was held in 1961. and resulted in the Guadala-
jam Supplementary Convention. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. This
Convention amended the Warsaw Convention to bring all camers of an interna-
tional flight (actual and contracting) within the purview of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. See id.
69. See Warsaw Convention. supra note I, art. 39 (allowing for any of the High
Contracting Parties to denounce the Convention by giving notice to the Polish
Government). Denunciation is to take place six months thereafter. Set' d.
70. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3. at 586-87.
71. See J.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw Svistem MontreaI 1999, 65 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 429, 430 (2000) (noting that the compromise is not a convention
nor a protocol to the Warsaw Convention, but a bilateral agreement).
72. See Special Notice of Limited Liability For Death or Injury Under the War-
saw Convention, 14 C.F.R. sec. 221.175 (1999).
73. See Waiver of Warsaw Convention Liability Limits and Defenses, 14
C.F.R. sec. 203 (1999).
74. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 59.
75. See id. art. 8.
76. See id. art. 10.
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fused to settle a claim within six months of receiving notice; 7 (d) ju-
risdiction where the passenger was domiciled or had a permanent
residence, if the carrier had a place of business there;"0 and (e)
authority by any country to create a supplemental compensation plan
funded by passenger contributions in amounts exceeding the absolute
limit of $100,000.79
Four additional protocols emerged in 1975 (Montreal Protocols
No. 1, 2, 3, & 4), primarily due to unstable gold prices in United
States dollars."' The French franc was replaced by Special Drawing
Rights ("SDR").8' In addition, The Hague and Guatemala provisions
(absolute liability with an unbreakable limit, a settlement inducement
clause, and a supplemental compensation plan) were incorporated.
Although Protocol No. 4 primarily concerned the simplification of
rules pertaining to cargo liability, it changed Article 25's willful mis-
conduct term to an "act or omission" of the carrier or its agents
committed "with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would result" as the proof needed to escape
the liability limit."' Moreover, it amended Article 24 by clarifying
how the Convention precluded passengers from bringing actions tin-
der local law when they could not establish air carrier liability under
77. See id. art. 7.
78. See id. art. 12.
79. See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 59, art. 14. In order for the Proto-
col to take effect, it needed ratification from thirty countries, five of which would
have to comprise forty percent of international air travel of ICAO member nations.
See id. art. 20(1); see also Frederico Ortino & Gideon R.E. Jurgens, The IATA
Agreements and the European Regulation: The Latest Attempts in the Pursuit of a
Fair and Uniform Liabilit" Regime for International Air Transportation, 64 J. AIR
L. CoM. 377, 384 (1999) (explaining how the U. S. failure to ratify the Protocol
effectively defeated the Protocol, given the U. S. share of the market).
80. See David I. Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Terrific: A Chronological Analy-
sis of the Liabilit, Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J.
AIR L & COMM. 653, 677-78 (1980).
81. The SDR was created by the International Monetary Fund and is based on
the currencies of France, the United States, Germany, England, and Japan. See
Learning Network, Special Drawing Rights, at http://www.infoplease.com/Cc6/
busiA0846206.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2001).
82. See Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 61, art. 25, reprinted in




The most recent reform efforts are the agreements promulgated by
the International Aviation Transit Association 4 and the Montreal
Convention of 1999.'5 Due to continued dissatisfaction with the
monetary limits, IATA moved to obtain agreement from its member
airlines to raise, by intercarrier agreement, the monetary limits under
the Warsaw Convention. These efforts resulted in the 1994 IATA
initiative, as the world governments had failed to ratify the prior
Guatemala and Montreal Protocols."' The centerpieces of the discus-
sions leading up to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement were: raising
the monetary limits, eliminating the willful misconduct provision,"
and allowing a claimant passenger to resort to his or her home coun-
try as the governing law for damages.
Under the JATA Intercarrier liability scheme," signatory carriers
agreed to a monetary limit of 100,000 SDRs and the elimination of
the willful misconduct component. Under this scheme-which is in
place today for most major airlines-there is no longer any require-
ment that the claimant establish willful misconduct in order to re-
cover more than the established limits."' A passenger claimant is en-
83. See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 59, art. 24.
84. The IATA is a private organization whose membership is comprised of in-
ternational air carriers, and whose purpose is to "ensure ... that aircraft can oper-
ate safely, securely, efficiently, and economically." IATA's Mission, at
http://wwwv.iata.orglmission.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2001).
85. Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62.
86. For a general discussion of the IATA Agreements, see Ortino & Jurgens,
supra note 79 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the IATA Agreements).
87. See Pickelman, supra note 67, at 289 (allowing a claimant to recover for
damages without requiring proof of the carrier's willful misconduct).
88. But see id. at 289 (stating that travelers exiting, entering, or going through
the United States claim damages under U. S. tort law).
89. The IATA Intercarrier Agreement is composed of three related, but sepa-
rate agreements: (1) the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability; (2)
the IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement;
and (3) the Air Transport Association's Provisions Implementing the IATA Inter-
carrier Agreement. See id. at 289 (describing the collective nature of IATA agree-
ments). The agreements, while separate, are intended to operate in conjunction
with one another. See id. (noting the effect that IATA agreements have on limiting
the Warsaw Convention's carrier liability).
90. See id.
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titled to receive damages for injuries up to 100,000 SDRs if he or she
meets the standard set forth in Article 17 (i.e., "accident", etc.)."' The
due care or "all reasonable measures" defense is only available for
claims of damages over 100,000 SDRs and again, is the burden of
the carrier to establish.92 The JATA scheme also allows the passenger
claimant to look to the law of his domicile or permanent residence in
determining recoverable damages.
93
Although most major carriers agreed to the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement,94 the Agreement remains problematic in several respects.
The most fundamental problem is that it is a contractual undertaking
which allows carriers to opt out, as opposed to a legally binding in-
ternational treaty. Consequently, the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization ("ICAO") 95 made efforts to reform the Warsaw Conven-
tion through amendment rather than by intercarrier agreement." The
primary focuses were, again, increasing the existing limits of liability
and ensuring that the changes or updates had the force and effect of
an international treaty. As a result, the Montreal Convention of 1999
came into existence as a compilation of the original Warsaw Con-
vention and subsequent protocols, including the Hague Protocol, the
Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and 4, the Guatemala City Protocol, and
the Guadalajara Supplementary Convention of 1961."7 Accordingly,
the liability scheme is similar to the two-tiered IATA agreements.
Moreover, the carrier is strictly liable up to 100,000 SDRs for death
91. See Pickelman, supra note 67, at 290.
92. See id.
93. But see id. at 291 (asserting that the IATA Intercarrier liability scheme pro-
vides for damages based on United States tort law).
94. See List of Carriers Signatory to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Pas-
senger Liability (IIA), at http://www.iata.org/legal/passengerjliability.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2001) (stating that, as of January 2001, the IATA (IIA) Agreement
had one-hundred-twenty-two carrier signatories, while the MIA and IPA had
ninety and twenty signatories respectively).
95. See About ICAO: Memorandum on ICAO, at http://www.icao.org (last
visited Jan. 26, 2001) (explaining the ICAO's function as a specialized agency of
the United Nations and its responsibility for administering the Warsaw Convention
and the related treaties and protocols).
96. See Batra, supra note 71, at 429 (discussing the history and drafting of the
Montreal Convention of 1999).
97. See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62.
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or injury of a passenger resulting from an "accident."" The injured
passenger bears the burden of proof to establish damages, and the
carrier can only escape or reduce its liability based on contributory
negligence of the passenger."" For provable damages over 100,000
SDRs, the carrier is liable based on fault-i.e., where the carrier es-
tablishes that the damage was not the result of its negligence or
"wrongful act or omission," or was the result of the "sole" negli-
gence or wrongful act or omission of a third party.'"
Other notable provisions include: automatic review of the SDR
limit every five years;... the passenger's option of filing suit where he
or she has a principal place of business and permanent residence;'"
mandatory advance payment obligation upon carrier in a sum to meet
the passengers' "immediate economical need";'" preemption over
claims arising out of international air travel:" inflationary adjust-
ment based on the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"); the right of carri-
ers to stipulate to higher limits;1 5 and the right of carriers to have re-
course against third parties.'"'
The advent of the IATA Agreements and the Montreal Convention
of 1999 represented landmark developments in the Warsaw scheme.
While the IATA agreements are intercarrier agreements made opera-
tive only by the voluntary participation of the individual carrier
through the filing of appropriate tariffs, the Montreal Convention of
1999 is a proposed international treaty which consolidates the five
different legal instruments comprising the Warsaw scheme into one
98. See id. art. 21(1) (describing the system of compensation for death and in-
jury under the 1999 Convention).
99. See id. art. 20 (allowing defendants to assert affirmative defenses).
100. See id. art. 21(2)(a)-(b).
101. See id. art. 24(1) (listing term limits of liability reviewv).
102. See Montreal Convention 1999. supra note 62. art. 33(2) (providing juns-
dictional requirements for actions to bring damages).
103. See id. art. 28.
104. See id. art. 29 (setting forth the Montreal Conention as a basis for air car-
riage claim).
105. See id. art. 25.
106. See id. art. 37.
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instrument.07
Both sets of instruments, however, adopt the SDR monetary sys-
tem, raise the monetary limits, and establish a two-tier liability sys-
tem. The Montreal Convention of 1999 has been ratified by seven
countries thus far,' 8 and needs thirty countries in order for it to be-
come operative.' 9 If ratified, the Convention would displace the
IATA Agreements, as it is an international treaty, instead of a private
accord.
The centerpieces of these reform efforts have been the low liability
limits, the time consuming and expensive litigation surrounding
claimants' attempts to break the liability limits by showing willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier, and the belief that the compen-
satory scheme should allow a passenger to be compensated accord-
ing to his or her own country's laws. With only one exception-the
Guatemala City Protocol of 1971-the accident requirement has not
been the topic of any of the reform efforts."0 Indeed, the wording of
Article 17 remains the same today as it did when the Convention was
originally enacted in 1929.
C. ARTICLE 17 AND ACCIDENT: TEXT, CONTEXT, TRA VAUX
PREPARA TOIRES, AND POST-RATIFICATION CONDUCT
While it is fairly universal that the goal in the interpretation of any
instrument is to effectuate the intent of the parties,"' treaty interpre-
107. See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62, art. 55 (describing the
Montreal Convention's relationship to the Warsaw Convention, The Hlague Proto-
col, the Guatemala City Protocol, and the Montreal Protocol).
108. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air Done at Montreal on 28 May 1999 (status as of 20 Nov. 2000), at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mt]99.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2001) (listing the
seven countries ratifying the Convention to date: Belize, the Czech Republic,
Mexico, Slovakia, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia.
109. See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62, art. 53(6) (describing the
process of signature, ratification, and entry with the Montreal Convention).
110. See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 59, art. 17(1) (imposing liability
on a carrier when a passenger is injured due to a causal "event" that was incident to
the carrier's operations).
111. See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1943) (describing the court's reliance on facts surrounding the treaty, along with
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tation is no different. According to the Vienna Convention," "a
treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose.""' 3 The basic rules include the need to uphold the
purposes of the treaty and give meaningful effect to the signature or
intent behind the treaty."4 Upon examination of the treaty's text and
the context in which the words are used," particularly with respect
to uncertain or ambiguous areas, one can resort to the "history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties." 6 Notions of liberality and good faith" are also commonly
invoked, as is the interpretation of sister signatories' courts."' Ac-
cording to the U. S. Supreme Court, as the "travaux preparatoires" of
the Warsaw Convention are published and are generally available to
litigants, courts will frequently refer to these materials to resolve
ambiguities in the text."9 With Article 17, in particular, the "travaux
preparatoires," context, and post-ratification conduct are crucial,
given that the article is "stark and undefined."':"
parties' understanding and intent, as important factors in treaty interpretation).
112. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States has never ratified the Vi-
enna Convention. See Chubb & Sons v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir.
2000). It nonetheless is used as a guide to international treaty interpretation as it is
a codification of customary international law. Id. (citing Maria Fran Kowska, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J.
INT'LL. 281, 286 (1988).
113. Vienna Convention, supra note 112, art. 32: see Air France v. Saks, 47)
U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (emphasizing that interpretation of a treaty requires one to
commence "with the text of the treaty and the context in which the words are
used."). In Eastern Airlines, hIc. v. Fioyd, 499 U.S. 530. 534 (19901), the Court in-
terpreted Article 17's "bodily injury" requirement and held that it does not encom-
pass mental injuries.
114. See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 531 (describing the need to consider signatory con-
duct in interpreting parties' intent).
115. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 397 (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,
53-54 (1963)).
116. Choctaw. 318 U.S. at432.
117. See Vienna Convention, supra note 112, art. 32.
118. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404 (emphasizing the importance of opinions and the
conduct of signatories in interpreting treaties).
119. Seeid.at400.
120. Janice Cousins, Note, Warsaw Conventioni-.4r Carrier Liability Ibr Pas-
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As originally enacted, Article 17 governing personal injury claims
provides as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a pas-
senger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking.'
2 1
Accordingly, the original Convention provides for liability for
"death, wounding or bodily injury" resulting from an "accident"
which occurred during the "international flight" or in the course of
any of the operations of "embarking or disembarking."'
Notably, the draft convention initially presented to the Warsaw
delegation by CITEJA made air carriers liable "in the case of death,
wounding or any other bodily injury suffered by a traveler," "in the
case of loss, damage or destruction of goods or baggage," or "the
case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods, or baggage." The liability
scheme did not textually include any requirement of causation and
made no mention or reference to "accident." Liability was likewise
the same for personal injuries and damage to goods or baggage. '
Pursuant to this initial draft, Article 22 permitted the carrier to avoid
liability by proving it had taken reasonable measures to avoid the
damage. 124
The minutes to the Convention establish that the term "accident"
itself was never discussed, but simply appeared in final form as re-
vised by the drafting committee at the Convention. 21 While there is
no information as to why or when this occurred, the wording remains
exactly the same today as it was then. Notably, the term "accident"
previously appeared in an early draft convention prepared by
senger Injuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 388
(1976).
121. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
122. See id.
123. See 1929 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 45, at 264-65 (listing liability of
the carrier as adopted by CITEJA in May 1928).
124. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
125. See 1929 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 45, at 267 (using the term "acci-
dent" in discussing the liability of third party carriers).
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CITEJA directed toward liability of carriers for damage or injury
caused to "person or objects" on the ground. I' Under this draft, li-
ability was imposed where the injury or damage was "caused by air-
craft,' '127 which is referenced in the draft as an "accident".'2' Further,
liability was limited to the value of the aircraft, and the carrier could
not be held liable where the damage was caused "by any person on
board the aircraft" who acted "intentionally by some act which had
nothing to do with the operation of the aircraft and without the op-
erator or his staff being able to prevent the damage."'' Finally, the
draft allowed the monetary limits to be exceeded if the "damage was
caused by his fault."' 30 This history is informative, as the use of "ac-
cident" by CITEJA was limited, tied to aircraft operation and modi-
fied by concepts of fault.
One can hardly disagree with the U. S. Supreme Court's descrip-
tion of Article 17 as "stark and undefined.""' The plain or ordinary
meaning of "accident" or, "l'accident", is certainly similar under
both English and French usage, and references an unexpected, for-
tuitous, or untoward event or happening. What it includes within its
126. See Ide, supra note 25, at 46, art. 1. CITEJA wvas charged with writing a
draft convention, which would then be addressed at the international conference.
See id. at 31. At the First Session of CITEJA on May of 1926, members identified
and divided a set of problems to study among four Commissions within the
CITEJA group. See id. at 32. The problems were identified as follows:
First Commission: (1) Nationality of aircraft: (2) aeronautical register (3)
ownership, co-ownership, construction, and transfer: (4) vested rights, mort-
gages, privileges and seizure. Second Commission: (1) Category of transport
(commercial transport, touring, etc.); (2) bill of loading: (3) liability of carer
towards consignors of goods and towards passengers; (4) jettison of cargo and
general damage; and (5) renting of aircraft. Third Commission: (1) Damage
and liability toward third parties (landing, collision, and jettison); (2) limits of
liability (contractual limitation, abandonment): and (3) insurance. Fourth
Commission: (1) Legal status of commanding officer and crew; (2) accidents
to the crew and insurance; (3) status of passengers: (4) la' governing acts
committed aboard aircraft.
Id. at33.
127. Id. at 46, art. 1.
128. Ide, supra note 25, at 47, arts. 5-6.
129. Id. at 46, art. 2(b).
130. Id. at 47, art. 8.
131. See Cousins, supra note 120, at 388.
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ambit, however, remains in question, as the context in which it is
used is what gives the term meaning. 3 2 The clear context is that "ac-
cident" was unequivocally tied to aircraft operation, aircraft crashes,
and aviation mishaps. Indeed, the very dictionary definitions of acci-
dent are invariably, if not always, provided by the context in which
the word is used (i.e., car accident, aviation accident, aircraft acci-
dent, etc.).'33 Thus, the omission by the Warsaw drafters to expressly
and specifically modify "accident" with aircraft operations or avia-
tion does not detract from its limited meaning as that was the une-
quivocal context in which it was used.'
It was obvious to the drafters that they were addressing aircraft
operational accidents. Indeed, the very purpose and heart of the 1929
conference was the concern over aircraft accidents and the associated
risks associated with aircraft operation and travel. One delegate de-
scribed accidents to be one of three things: (1) those that arise out of
errors in piloting; (2) those that arise out of a defect in the function-
ing of the aircraft; and (3) those designated as being an act of God.'
As such, the intent was to impose liability for accidents endemic to
aviation, the aircraft, or its operation. In fact, the Convention placed
the burden of proof upon the carrier to establish its due diligence to
avoid liability for any "accident," as it was understood that the car-
rier would have the most knowledge regarding the cause of the ac-
count as it would necessarily involve the aircraft or its operation.' 3" It
is this fundamental understanding that has been ignored in many
modem decisions applying the Convention to modem day distur-
bances, especially passenger upon passenger misconduct.
Delegates' opposition to identical liability rules for personal injury
and property claims at the 1929 Convention resulted in a proposal to
make a carrier liable for injuries caused by "accidents" and for dam-
132. See Maxirnov, 373 U.S. at 53-54 (commenting that words used in treaties
are to be interpreted based on the context in which they are used).
133. See HARPER ET AL., FRENCH UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1997).
134. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (noting the drafters' intent
to impose liability when the injury or damage was "caused by aircraft," which is
referenced as "accident").
135. See 1929 Warsaw Minutes, supra note 45, at 52.
136. See id. at 44, 52, 69; GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 200.
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age to goods or baggage caused by "occurrences."" Even though
many other delegates felt it was unnecessary, delegates made this
distinction because "Article 22 establishe[d] a very mitigated system
of liability for the carrier, and from the moment that the carrier has
taken reasonable measures, he does not answer for the risks, nor for
the accidents occur[ring] to people by the fault of third parties, nor
for accidents occur[r]ing for any other cause.""' According to the
Supreme Court, "the records of the negotiations of the Convention
accordingly support what is evident from its text: A passenger's in-
jury must be caused by an accident, and an accident must mean
something different than an 'occurrence' on the plane.""'
In post-ratification meetings of the ICAO Legal Committee of the
International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"), debate contin-
ued over whether to maintain the distinction. Some expressed the
concern that "occurrence" for personal injury claims would be too
broad. In fact, the specific instance of a passenger "attack" upon an-
other was provided as an example which "occurrence" would cover
and "accident" would not.'' At another meeting of the ICAO Legal
Committee in 1951, delegates debated this distinction one again.'4 A
majority of delegates, including the United States, opposed any
change with reference to instances of passenger attacks and air sick-
ness as not being a risk for which the carrier should be responsible.' 42
Just prior to the Hague Convention of 1955, the consensus of the
137. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 402 (1985).
138. 1929 Warsaw Minutes, supra note 45, at 77-78.
139. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 402-03 (1985).
140. See Report of the Subconmn. on the Revision ofthe Warsaw Convention,
ICAO Legal Comm. Minutes and Documents of the 4th Sess., at 270, ICAO Doe.
6027-LC/124 (1949) (agreed that "the term 'occurrence' would be too broad.., as
this expression would cover the case of independent action among passengers such
as an attack by one passenger upon another with consequent bodily injury to the
latter.").
141. See Report of the Subconmn. on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention,
ICAO Legal Comm. Minutes and Documents of the 8th Sess., at 136-38, ICAO
Doc. 7229-LC/133 (1951); Report of the United States Delegation to the 8th Sess.
of the Legal Committee of ICAO (1951), at §(e)(l) (Emmory T. Nunneley, Jr.,
Chairman, U.S. Delegation), reprinted in 19 J. AIR L & CoMM. 70, 79 (1952) (dis-
cussing opposing views and indicating opposition to change concerned about pas-
senger upon passenger attacks being carrier liability).
142. See id.
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Committee, with the strong urging of the U. S. delegation, was again
that "accident" was the better standard.' 43 An attack by one passenger
upon another was noted as an example of an event not intended to be
the carrier's responsibility under the liability scheme. '4" As a result,
the Hague Protocol contained no changes to Article 17, demonstrat-
ing an intent that liability should not arise for claims unrelated to air-
craft operation or an aviation event.
The terms of Article 17 liability were also the subject of the Con-
vention held at Guatemala City in 1971. There, delegates proposed
and adopted to change the term "accident" to "event." Article 17 to
the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 read as follows:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal in-
jury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which caused the
death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not
liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of health of the
145
passenger.
Accordingly, Article 17 would impose liability for an "event"
which caused the death or injury, rather than an "accident" which
caused the death or injury. The version continued to exempt the car-
rier from liability if death or injury resulted "solely from the state of
the health of the passenger.' 46 The Guatemala Protocol likewise re-
moved the willful misconduct and the "all necessary measures" de-
fense. The delegates understood that the change from "accident" to
"event" was a significant expansion of potential liability. Indeed, the
Italian delegation proposed that "accident" be retained in order to
clarify how carrier liability would be imposed only in the case of a
"malfunction of service" or "abnormal event directly connected with
143. See Report of the Subeomm. on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention,
ICAO Legal Comm. Minutes and Documents of the 9th Sess., at 71, ICAO Doc.
7450-LC/136-1 (1954) (U.S. Delegate, Mr. Calkins).
144. See id. (asserting that "an attack by one passenger against another might
come within the Warsaw Convention, if the proposed changes were made, and
place liability where liability heretofore did not belong.").




air transport operations."' 4' A similar alternative proposal from the
same delegation sought to add the following clarifying language if
"event" was retained: "However, the carrier cannot be liable if the
death or injury result from an event unrelated to air transport opera-
tions.' 48 The concern was that "the carrier would be held responsible
even though it had nothing whatsoever to do with the event from
which the injury had resulted, and the dispute could just as easily
have arisen somewhere else.""'
It is noteworthy that at the Fifth International Air Navigation Con-
gress in 1930, Professor Goedhuis, the original reporter to the Con-
vention, suggested a clarification by adding the words "un connexe
avec le transport."'50 The Italian Delegation, however, originally rec-
ommended to reject this proposal at the 1929 Convention, as a con-
nection to the carriage was deemed obvious." This is entirely con-
sistent with efforts to clarify how, with the Guatemala Protocol, if
"event" was used, drafters would need to add language providing
that no liability could result if the event was unrelated to air transport
operations. ' Consequently, the use and retention of "accident" as-
sumed, and was limited to, an aircraft aviation accident. Again, the
specific example of passenger upon passenger misconduct was refer-
enced as an example of potential liability under "event", which was
not the liability intended.5' Indeed, delegates referenced the fact that
such incidents did not have "a direct connection with an accident re-
sulting from the operation of the aircraft."" 4
The Guatemala Protocol's replacement of "accident" with "event"
created an absolute liability scheme and diminished, if not elimi-
147. 2 Int'l Civ. Aviation Org., Int'l Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City,
IACO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 p. 32, 44 (1972) [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol Min-
utes].
148. Id. at 44.
149. Id. at 32-33, 48.
150. ELMAR MARIA GIEMULLA, WARSAW CONVENTION: CO\IME\T[ARY 10
(1992).
151. See id. at 10, n.5 (citing Minutes II to Air Navigation Conference at 1168,
1177).
152. See Guatemala Protocol Minutes, supra note 147, at 44.
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
154. Guatemala Protocol Minutes, supra note 147, at 144.
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nated, any need for the accident to be related to aviation. The Proto-
col, however, was never ratified by the U. S. Senate, and has never
been ratified by the necessary number of countries to make it opera-
tive.'55 The failure to ratify the Proposal left the unamended Article
17 intact and the understanding that "accident" required some in-
volvement or complicity of the air carrier or, at least, some relation
to the operation of the aircraft.
Based on this history, the use of the term accident did not create
absolute liability for passenger upon passenger incidents absent some
causal involvement or complicity of the air carrier, because such an
event does not necessarily have a relation to aviation or aircraft op-
eration. The intent of the drafters was to cover aviation accidents,'56
not the traditional risks undertaken by a common carrier.'"
D. THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT OF 1966 AND THE
ELIMINATION OF THE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES DEFENSE
The Montreal Interim Agreement'5 resulted in the elimination of
Article 20's "all necessary measures" defense" 9 for all carriers serv-
155. See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 59 (noting that the United States
was one of thirty-three countries to sign the Protocol, but that only seven of those
countries ratified it, excluding the United States). The governing Nixon admini-
stration never submitted the Protocol to the Senate for ratification due to the fact
that the Protocol linked the liability to the gold standard. See Nicolas M. Matte,
The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8 ANNALS OF AIR &
SPACE L. 151, 158 (1983).
156. See, e.g., Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir.
1978) (stating that the "drafter of the treaty proposed to limit liability for injuries
caused by air accidents."); GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 218 (interpreting the word
"accident" to include those related to carriages).
157. See GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 218, 233, 236-37 (explaining that airline
passengers, unlike passengers flying on more traditional means of transportation,
accept the risks associated with flying).
158. Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 58.
159. The "all reasonable measures" defense, sometimes referenced as the "due
care" defense, can be found in Article 20 of the original Convention, which pro-
vides:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he had his agents take all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or
them to take such measures; and (2) In the transportation of goods and bag-
gage the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was occa-
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icing the United States. This defense obligated the carrier to prove
that the accident was caused by something beyond its control. Al-
though awkwardly worded, most authorities equate the "all necessary
measures" defense to mean all reasonable measures and represent the
fundamental fault based notions underlying the Convention."" The
Agreement resulted after the United States announced its intention to
withdraw from the Warsaw system due to the low liability limits.""
The compromise was the increase in the monetary limits and the
elimination of the due diligence defense, resulting in what was per-
ceived as a "virtual strict liability" scheme for injury or death.' "
Courts have since relied upon the elimination of the "all necessary
measures" defense to assert that acts or omissions of the carrier or
relationship with aircraft operation play no part in interpreting and
applying the term "accident" to injury claims."" In fact, many courts
viewed the Montreal Interim Agreement as essentially establishing
absolute and expansive liability. " One obvious fault with this view
sioned by an error in piloting in the handling of the aircraft or in navigation
and that, in all other respects, he and his agents had taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1. art. 20(1).
160. See Hanover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 964, 961 (1977)
(noting that "Article 20 requires of a defendant proof, not of a surfeit of preventa-
fives, but rather an understanding embracing all precautions that in sum are appro-
priate to the risk, i.e., measures reasonably available to defendant and reasonably
calculated, in cumulation to prevent the subject loss."), see also Verdesca v.
American Airlines, Inc., 2000 WL 1538704, at *10 (N.D.Tex., Oct. 17, 2000)
(noting that failure to take any particular precaution that might prevent accident
does not prevent carrier from relying on reasonable measures defense).
161. Unhappy with the low limits, the United States gave formal notice re-
nouncing its participation in the Warsaw Convention on November 15, 1965,
which became effective on May 15, 1966. See Dep't of State Release No. 268
(Nov. 15, 1965), reprinted in 53 Dep't State Bull. 923-24 (Dec. 6, 1965). The de-
nunciation was pursuant to Article 39 of the original Warsaw Convention, wvhich
allows any member country to opt out of the Convention, as long as they provide
six months notice. See id.
162. See Air France v. Saks, 724 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470
U.S. 392 (1985).
163. See, e.g., Lahey v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 115 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466-67
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
164. See Saks, 724 F.2d at 1386; Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
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is that it fails to recognize that the Montreal Interim Agreement was
an accord, not an international treaty.1 65 While an accord is simply a
private agreement, an international treaty is part of the supreme law
of the land. 66 As such, the Montreal Interim Agreement neither
amends the Convention nor directly affects its interpretation. More
fundamentally, this approach neglects the fact that the Convention
set up a very specific liability scheme with "accident" as only one
component and which term was to be confined to aviation mishaps.
6
1
There was also the understanding that concepts of fault, shifts in the
burden of proof, and monetary limits would apply to carrier liabil-
ity.'16 The scheme envisioned those air disasters where information
would likely be difficult to obtain or more readily available to the
carrier. 1 9 If the cause of the aviation accident could not be deter-
mined (due to destruction or loss of the aircraft), then the carrier
would remain liable. This has no applicability, however, to passenger
upon passenger misconduct or other related incidents.
Equally significant is that the elimination of the due diligence de-
fense by the Montreal Interim Agreement was hasty and without a
real agreement that no-fault was a necessary change to the Conven-
tion. The change was made with virtually little analysis or consid-
eration of the fact that the Convention was originally based on fault
concepts and set forth a system of liability. 70 While it is one thing to
165. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702, 704 n.I
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing how the Montreal Interim Agreement imposes upon
international aviation a quasi-legal system of liability that is essentially contractual
in nature).
166. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Butler's Shoe Corp. v. Pan Am World Airways,
Inc., 514 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention is within the court's jurisdiction).
167. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
168. See RENE H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AIR CARRIER: A COMMENTARY ON THE PRESENT WARSAW SYSTEM 91 (1981);
MILLER, supra note 26, at 65 (explaining that in order for Articles 17, 18, and 19
of the Warsaw Convention to cover all liabilities, they must be read in conjunction
with other provisions).
169. See 1929 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 45, at 21, 37, 252; GOEDHUIS, su-
pi-a note 40, at 38, 217, 218, 230; see also George W. Orr, Fault As the Basis of
Liabili,, 21 J. AIR L. & COMM. 399, 403 (1954) (challenging the assumption that
a switch in the burden of proof is necessary in aviation disasters).
170. See Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, 589 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1978) (cit-
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be concerned with monetary limits, it is quite another to eliminate
one fundamental and interrelated component of the overall scheme
without clarifying, changing or addressing "'accident." Noteworthy in
this regard is that the "all reasonable measures" term was understood
to require the carrier to establish that damage or loss was caused by a
"cas de force majeure," by a third party, or by an event unrelated to
the operation of the aircraft. '
An in-depth account of the events leading up to the Montreal
Agreement demonstrates that the elimination of the fault based de-
fense was only and belatedly introduced in the face of the severe
economic and international ramifications carriers and other nations
would face if the United States withdrew from the Warsaw system.""
Many thought that, without the United States' approval, the system
would fail.1 73 The proposal of no fault arose late in the conference
after it became clear that a majority of delegates would not agree to
the United States' demand of a S100,000 limit.'" While many air-
lines felt the S 100,000 limit was excessive, poorer nations felt it was
unfair for "the peasant to pay for the comfort of the King." Thus,
several countries sought to persuade the United States to agree to a
lower limit by proposing absolute liability with a $75,000 limit. ' -
The advantage of the plan was that it would allow the U. S. delega-
ing Dep't of State Press Release No. 268. 50 Dep't of State Bull. 923-24 (19b5)).
The hastiness with which the Montreal Interim Agreement eliminated the "due
care" defense is exemplified by the fact that virtually all of the discussion or debate
that led up to its existence focused exclusively on the limits, not the defense itself.
See id. Indeed, the press release announcing the denunciation expressed dissatis-
faction only with the monetary limits, not a fault based system. See id. Moreover,
the parties entered into the Agreement one day before the United States' with-
drawal would have become effective. See id.
171. See MILLER, supra note 26, at 142.
172. See Lowenfeld & Mendolsohn, supra note 3. at 588.
173. See id. at 591-92.
174. See id. at 586-87 (observing that the prospect of the United States' wvith-
drawal from the Warsaw system led conference delegates to suggest an absolute
liability arrangement in exchange for a retreat of the United States' position in
support of a S 100,000 limit).
175. Id. at 565 (paraphrasing the statement of a Nigerian delegate).
176. See Lowenfeld & Mendolsohn, supra note 3. at 570 (observing that the
proposal would benefit the United States delegation by guaranteeing passengers
some recovery in all cases).
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tion to save face by trumpeting a new advantage for passengers. De-
spite attempts to reconcile differences, however, the proposal was
rejected.'77
Only after the conference had concluded, and just before the
United States was to formally withdraw from the Convention, did
carriers succumb to the pressure and accept the no-fault standard
with a liability limit of $75,000.178 The no-fault standard was not em-
braced by other countries, was contrary to the fault principle under-
lying the convention and common law, was never subjected to any
congressional hearings or Senate approval, and resulted only as a
political compromise. 7 9 Therefore, the emergence of the no fault
concept was more the result of political expediency than any consen-
sus or doctrinal acceptance. 8 o
The discussions following the Montreal Interim Agreement,'" and
those prior to the Guatemala Protocol, noted that even with the
elimination of the due care defense, "the possibility of making the
carrier liable independent of the 'risks of the air' (and independent of
fault) is small," because under the Convention an "accident" is re-
quired and the carrier has the possibility of asserting contributory
177. See id. at 573 (stating that while seventeen delegates voted for a limit of
75,000 with absolute liability, twenty-seven delegates voted against the proposal
and eight abstained).
178. See id. at 587-97 (describing the last minute decisions by various carriers to
accept the $75,000 limit on liability without regard to fault on the part of the car-
rier). Many countries or carriers did not embrace the inclusion of the no-fault pro-
posal in the interim agreement; they considered it controversial because it signaled
a departure from the common law principle of liability for fault only. See id. at
588-96.
179. See id.
180. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text; see also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 590 (explaining that what prompted the International
Association of Carriers, the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"),
and international carriers to accept the no-fault standard was the fear that the
United States would withdraw from the Convention and cause the whole treaty to
come undone, thereby defeating the uniformity of documentation and legal rules
achieved by the Convention).
181. See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 410 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (explaining that the ICAO held meetings to discuss possible liability
systems between 1966-1970).
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negligence on the part of the passenger."2 "Murder or infection by a
fellow passenger or a heart attack" were cited as the only "excep-
tional cases" where a carrier could be liable "for damage which is
unrelated to the 'risks of the air and to which the carrier has in no
way contributed by negligence."'"" Delegates found this concern to
be "unjustified" and resolved the problem by construing "accident,"
for which there is no due care defense, as equating to an "aircraft ac-
cident. ' ' '
Accordingly, while the liability scheme was drastically altered
with the elimination of the "due diligence" defense, the "accident"
requirement was ignored and unchanged. ' The failure to provide
clarity for what constitutes an "accident", however, continues today
and has paved the way for carrier liability to be extended beyond
both the Convention's intention and the prior and present objectives




II. ARTICLE 24 AND EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE
CONVENTION
The Convention's preemptive or exclusive effect over other
sources of potentially applicable law was unclear until recently."
Given that the fundamental purpose of the Convention was to pro-
vide a uniform system of rules, the delegates certainly believed the
Convention would have a substantial preemptive scope."' The issue
was to what extent the Convention would have preemptive power,
given that the Convention incorporated express reference to local law
182. See id. at 411 (citing Report of Subcomm. on Revision ofthe Warsaw ('on-
vention as Amended by the Hague Protocol. ICAO Doc. 8839-LC 158-1, Report,
para. 7, at 2 (1969) (statement of Reporter, Dr. Swart)).
183. Id.
184. See id. (concluding that the easiest way to resolve the difficulty of deter-
mining under which circumstances absolute liability would attach, independent of
the "risks of the air," is to limit the "absolute liability of the carer to aircraft acci-
dents.").
185. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
186. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the Warsaw Liability Scheme).
187. See infra notes 188-227 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Convention's
goal of uniform rules governing claims).
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in many of its provisions.' 9 Indeed, the Convention expressly pro-
vided for resort to local law, based on the forum's choice of law
rules, on such issues as recoverable damages,'"' contributory or com-
parative negligence,' 9' award of costs,' 92 issues of procedure,'" cal-
culation of the limitation period,'94 and definition of willful miscon-
duct.'9'
The original text of Article 24 of the Convention provides as fol-
lows:
1. In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this Convention.
2. In cases covered by article 17, the provisions of the preceding para-
graph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are
the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective
• 1 96
rights. "
Prior to the Montreal Convention of 1999, of the five subsequent in-
struments to the Convention, only the Guatemala City Protocol of
189. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1996) (holding
that Article 17 of the Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable
harm recognized under domestic law).
190. See Warsaw Convention, supra note I, arts. 17-19 (providing carrier liabil-
ity for damages relating to personal injury, checked baggage, and transportation
delay).
191. See id. art. 21 (stating that the court to which a claim was submitted may
exempt carriers from liability in accordance with their own law where a carrier
proves that damage was caused in whole or in part by the injured party).
192. See id. art. 22 (setting forth maximum amounts of liability for recoverable
damages, and providing that the form of payments be governed by the law of the
court to which the claim was submitted).
193. See id. art. 28 (establishing that procedural questions be determined by the
law of the court to which the claim was submitted).
194. See id. art. 29 (providing a two year statute of limitations to be calculated
according to the law of the court to which the claim was submitted).
195. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25 (stating that provisions
which exempt or limit a carrier's liability are not available to carriers who have
demonstrated willful misconduct as defined by the law of the court to which a
claim was submitted).
196. See id. art. 24.
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1971 and the Montreal Protocol No. 4 addressed the exclusivity lan-
guage set forth in Article 24.', " While the Guatemala Protocol of
1971 was primarily aimed at increasing the limits of liability to ap-
proximately $100,000,'" it also amended Article 24 to read as fol-
lows:
1. In the carriage of cargo, any action for damages. howe\ er founded, can
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Con-
vention.
2. In the carriage of passengers and baggage, any action for damages.
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort
or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits of
liability set out in this Convention, without prejudice to the question as to
who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their re-
spective rights. Such limits of liability constitute maximum limits and
may not be exceeded whatever the circumstances which gave rise to the
liability.'"
By adding "whether under this Convention, or in contract, or in
tort, or otherwise," the drafters made the preemptive scope of the
Convention expressly clear.-' The Guatemala Protocol, however,
was never ratified by the United States, nor did the necessary number
of countries adopt it to give it worldwide effect.:'
The amended language in Article 24 was subsequently included, in
its entirety, in the later Montreal Protocol No. 4 proposed in 1975.'2
197. See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
198. See Rene H. Mankiewicz, Warsaw Convention: The 1971 Protocol of
Guatemala City, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 335. 335 (1972) (stating that the basis for the
Diplomatic Conference in Guatemala was the United States' agreement to with-
draw its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention). The United States threatened to
withdraw from the Convention because it considered the liability limit to be too
low under The Hague Protocol. See id.
199. See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 59, art. IX.
200. Cf Mankiewicz, supra note 198, at 336-37 (pointing out that the additional
language of "whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or othern ise"
after "however founded" in paragraph two of Article 24. reflects the compromise
made by delegates to provide for an unbreakable limit of liability, and forecloses
the possibility of damages exceeding the S 100,000 dollar limitation).
201. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
202. See Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 61. art. VIII (establishing that the
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Montreal Protocol No. 4 made clear that the Convention precludes
passengers from bringing actions for bodily iniury, delay in cargo or
baggage damages under local law. °3 Pursuant to this Protocol, the
Convention provided an exclusive remedy even in instances where
the international passenger could not establish liability under the
Convention.2°  Montreal Protocol No. 4 became effective in the
United States in March of 1999205 and has been held by some courts
to have retroactive effect.2 6 Separately, the Montreal Convention of
1999, which is open for ratification but has not yet been enforced,
has also incorporated the same amended language.01
Prior to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol No. 4, Article 24's
instruction that "cases covered by article 17" may "only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention"20 cre-
ated a court split on whether the language and/or purpose of the
Convention precluded a claimant from resorting to local law reme-
dies. Courts finding the Convention to be nonexclusive interpreted
amended language of Article 24 under the Guatemala Protocol replace the lan-
guage of Article 24 under the Convention).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See 144 CONG. REC. S 11059 (Sept. 28, 1998).
206. See Hermano v. United Airlines, No. C 99-0105, 1999 WL 1269187, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1999) (concluding that amendments made to the Convention
by the Montreal Protocol were clarifications, rather than substantive legal changes,
and as such, application of the amended changes to the case before the court did
not raise constitutional issues). Separately, the Montreal Convention of 1999,
which is currently open for ratification, incorporated the same amendment lan-
guage. See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62.
207. See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62.
208. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24.
209. See Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1518 n.8 (11th Cir.
1997) (recognizing a circuit split on whether the Warsaw Convention preempts
state law). Compare Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1984)
(stating that the Warsaw Convention does not preclude passengers unable to re-
cover under the Warsaw Convention from pursuing state law remedies), and
Beaudet v. British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (N.D. II1. 1994) (enu-
merating the number of cases which exemplify the divergence of views over
whether a claimant's failure to satisfy terms under the Convention precludes a
claimant's recovery under state law), with Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 132
F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that all state law claims falling within provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention are preempted by the Convention), and Potter v.
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Article 24's language of "any action for damages, however
founded," to establish an intent that state law causes of action would
survive the Convention subject to the limitation of liability imposed
by the Convention.1 0 Under this view, so long as state law was inter-
preted to limit liability to the amount available under the Warsaw
Convention, it was not preempted.2" Courts finding the Convention
to be nonexclusive, however, interpreted Article 24 to preempt only
those cases in which a passenger could actually maintain a claim for
relief under Article 17." Under this approach, Article 24 would
permit any passenger whose personal injury suit did not satisfy the
liability conditions of Article 17, i.e., "accident" and "bodily injury,"
to pursue the claim under local law.1" Support for this interpretation
was found in the various provisions of the Convention expressly in-
Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Warsaw
Convention created an exclusive remedy for claims resulting from personal injury
accidents aboard an aircraft, precluding resort to state claims).
210. See Zinn v. American Jet, S.A., No. CV 96-4251, 1996 WL 757191, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 1996) (holding that Article 24's express language of any action
"however founded" indicates the drafters' intention that the Warsaw Convention
does not preclude causes of action based on state law). Further, the court reasoned
that because the drafters failed to create a set of conditions and limitations applica-
ble to all possible causes of action created by any country's local law, state causes
of action were not precluded. See id. at *3; see also Gensplit Fin. Corp. v. Pan
American World Airways, 581 F. Supp. 1241, 1242 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (holding that
a cause of action provided to the plaintiff under the Warsaw Convention did not
preclude plaintiff from bringing a cause of action under the Federal Bill of Lading
Act).
211. See Zinn, 1996 WL 757191, at *5 (stating that so long as liabilty under
state law is constrained to limitations set forth under the Warsaw Convention, state
law does not conflict with the Convention).
212. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.. 872 F.2d 1462. 1482 (11 th Cir. 19891
(concluding that the Warsaw Convention only preempts causes of action recog-
nized under state law that are inconsistent with the Convention).
213. See Beaudet, 853 F. Supp. at 1073 (holding that when a claim falls outside
the Convention's scope, such as when a passenger is not on an aircraft or in the
course of embarking or disembarking, the Convention does not pre-empt a state
law cause of action for negligence), see also Floy'd, 872 F.2d at 1482 (declining to
decide whether the Warsaw Convention "'entirely" preempts state law causes of
action" that fall within the definition of"accident" under Article 17); In re Mexico
City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
that it appears the drafters "did not intend that the cause of action created by the
Convention to be exclusive.").
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corporating local law. ' 4 For example, in Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines, the Supreme Court held that the Convention left the determi-
nation of the availability of compensatory damages to local law."'
Indeed, the view was that the Convention intended to allow national
laws to provide a passenger with a remedy when the Convention did
not.
216
The debate was resolved in January 1999 by the Supreme Court in
El Al Israel Airlines, Inc. v. Tseng2' 7 and the U. S. Senate's adoption
of the Montreal Protocol No. 4 in March of 1999.218 Prior to Tseng,
courts in both the United Kingdom and Canada found the Conven-
tion to be exclusive.1 9 In Tseng, however, the Court made it clear
that recovery for personal injury suffered "on board [an] aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking," if
not allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is not avail-
able at all. 20 The Court's emphasis on the Convention's "comprehen-
214. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 21 (contributory negligence),
24 (standing), 25 (misconduct), 28 (questions of procedure), 29 (statute of limita-
tions computation). See generally supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
215. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1995) (con-
cluding that statements derived from the drafting history of the Warsaw Conven-
tion indicate that questions of who may recover and the extent to which compen-
satory damages are available were left unresolved by the Warsaw Convention and
are to be addressed by "private international law").
216. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
217. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161 (holding that if recovery for personal injuries is
not provided under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, recovery is not available
at all).
218. See 144 CONG. REC. S 11059 (Sept. 28, 1998). The Protocol entered into
force in the United States on March 4, 1999. See id.
219. See Sindu v. British Airways, PLC, [1997] 1 A.C. 193, 207. In Sint, the
Court stated that the purpose of Article 17 is "to prescribe the circumstances, that
is to say the only circumstances, in which a carrier will be liable in damages to the
passenger for claims arising out of his international carriage by air." Id. at 207; see
also Naval-Torres v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., [1998] 159 D.L.R. 4th 67, 76 (not-
ing that claims under the Convention are exclusive). The court read Article 24's
reference to "cases covered under Article 17" to mean those cases within the Con-
vention not covered by Article 18 (baggage) and Article 19 (delay), rather than
distinguish between incidents of personal injury that are or are not within the pro-
visions of the Convention. See id.
220. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
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sive scheme of liability rules" and goals of uniformityf-' enabled it to
conclude that allowing air carriers to be subject to "distinct, non-
uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations" would be
an unreasonable construction of the Convention.:: The Court also
based its opinion on the consideration that a nonexclusive interpreta-
tion of liability under the Convention might encourage plaintiffs to
attempt to opt out of the Convention's liability scheme where local
laws provided maximum limits of liability above those available un-
der the Convention.2'-
The Supreme Court made clear, however, that the exclusive effect
of the Convention was not all-encompassing, by stating that "the
Convention's preemptive effect on local law extends no further than
the Convention's own substantive scope. "" As such, a carrier is
subject to liability under local law for injuries arising outside of the
air transportation or "any of the operations of embarking" or "disem-
barking."':
The Supreme Court's decision in Tseng, the adoption of Montreal
Protocol No. 4, and the pending Montreal Convention of 1999 all
expressly indicate that the Convention provides an exclusive remedy
supplanting resort to local law remedies. The issue that emerges is
what effect the exclusivity will play in the Court's interpretation of
the liability rules of the Convention, particularly Article 17. "" Given
221. See id. at 169 (stating that it would be difficult to conclude that delegates to
the Convention intended to subject air carriers to non-uniform local laws, giv en the
textual emphasis on uniformity and the vast scope of the Conventions liability
rules).
222. Id. at 171.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 172 (citing Brief for the United States as .Ancus Curiae 16).
225. Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172.
226. Noteworthy is the remaining question of whether a state law claim can be
asserted where there was no accident, but the injury was caused by the willful or
intentional conduct of the carrier. See Loryn B. Zerner. Tseng v. El .1.4irlhnes andi
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, 14 ANI. U. INT'L L. REX'. 1245, 1273 (1999)
(arguing that "in light of the unequal positions between air camers and passengers,
an injured party denied recovery under Article 17 should be allowed recovery un-
der the willful misconduct exception set forth in Article 25."). Virtually all lower
courts that have addressed this issue have found that Article 25 only comes into
play if an Article 17 accident is established. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng, 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that Tseng mistakenly asserts that
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that claimants will have no remedy for personal injuries suffered
during international flights, or in the course of operations of em-
barking or disembarking, if they cannot establish an "accident" or
"bodily injury," courts may be more inclined to broadly apply the
Convention's liability prerequisites. Indeed, the Court in Tseng could
have arguably foreshadowed such a result when it stated, in dicta,
that it disagreed with the lower court's conclusion, which was not be-
fore the Supreme Court, that the routine security search to which
Ms. Tseng was subjected was likely an "accident.
'227
El Al's conduct is "willful misconduct" under Article 25 and, therefore, constitutes
an "accident" as defined under Article 17); Brandt v. American Airlines, Inc., No.
C 98-2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2000) (holding that Ar-
ticle 25 does not provide an independent cause of action under local law when
willful misconduct is alleged); McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 54 F. Supp.
2d 1313, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit previously held
that Article 25 does not create a separate cause of action from Article 17); Carey v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Or. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff
must assert a valid Article 17 claim before reaching a claim under Article 25);
Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Il1. 1986) (stating that
"Article 25 is most reasonably interpreted as an exception to the Convention's
limitations on the recovery of compensatory damages, not as authority for a form
of damages not permitted elsewhere in the Convention."). Further, the concern
that, without such a reading of Article 25, carriers cannot be held accountable for
intentional torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment, is simply ill-
founded; accidents cover both negligent and intentional conduct of the carrier. See
Laor v. Air France, 31 F. Supp. 2d 247, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that an "acci-
dent" can occur from an "inappropriate or unintended happenstance" during air-
craft operation). If the carrier's agent commits an intentional tort, then the conduct
would clearly be an abnormal aircraft operation and unexpected event rendering
the carrier liable. See id.
227. See Tseng, 119 525 U.S. at 166 n.9 (defining "accident" under Article 17 as
an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger").
Apparently, Ms. Tseng gave "illogical" responses to routine questions during
screening and was classified as a "high risk" passenger. See Tseng, 122 F.3d at
101. She was thus subjected to a security search pursuant to the carrier's security
procedures, taken to a private room, and searched. See id. at 163, 164. She was re-
quired to remove her jacket and sweater, and lower her blue jeans. See id. A female
security guard searched her entire body, including her breasts and her groin area.
See id. The search was pursuant to standard procedures and, thus, was not an ab-
normal operation necessary for Article 17 liability. See id. Of course, if the claimed
"illogical" answers that formed the basis for the search were false, then an accident
would exist, as it would constitute an abnormal operation and deviation from stan-
dard procedures. See id. at 158 (stating that a security search of a passenger based
solely on "suspicion of circumstances" subjects the carrier to liability under Article
17).
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF ACCIDENT AND EXCLUSIVITY
Articles 17 and 24 have a symbiotic relationship. That is, whether
or not an event is an accident can conclusively determine whether the
claimant will have any remedy at all."' Moreover, the scope of the
Convention's exclusivity turns upon whether the event or injury
arose out of the international flight or in the course of embarking or
disembarking, notions akin to determining Article 17 liability.::'
A. EXCLUSIVITY
Since Tseng, and the adoption of the Montreal Protocol No. 4,
only a limited number of courts have addressed the parameters of the
Convention's exclusivity.-0 Under the instruction of Tseng and the
terms of the Convention, the Convention precludes any resort to al-
ternative law, where the injury arose out of the international flight or
out of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking, regard-
less of whether the event constitutes an accident!" The few courts
that have addressed the scope of the Convention's exclusivity since
Tseng generally have done so in a relatively broad fashion.:'
228. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (defining "accident" in
Article 17 of the Convention to include willful acts of misconduct); Asher v.
United Airlines, 70 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617 (D. Md. 1999) (asserting that plaintiffs
must establish the incident as an "accident" in order to recover damages under the
Convention).
229. See Asher, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (stating that the Warsaw Convention gov-
erns personal injury claims that occur during a flight or the act of embarking or
disembarking).
230. See, e.g., Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc., 193 F.3d 526 (D. Colo. 1999)
(holding that fraud and deceit claims related to luggage claim are preempted under
the Convention); Donkor v. British Airways Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 963, 967-68
(1999) (noting that breach of contract, negligence, wrongful detention, and assault
claims resulting from detention and deportation are preempted); Asher, 70 F. Supp.
2d at 618 (stating that defamation, false arrest, and assault based claims, grounded
on airline carrier claim that passenger was a thief, were preempted).
231. See Asher, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (noting that the Supreme Court found that
"the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention ... is to achiev[e] uniformity of
rules governing claims arising from international air transportation).
232. See generally Cruz, 193 F.3d at 526; Donkor, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 963; Asher,
70 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
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Courts have found a wide range of claims to be preempted, in-
cluding claims for breach of contract, negligence, false arrest, false
imprisonment, civil rights, malicious prosecution, defamation, deceit,
assault, and battery.23 Even federal statutory claims of discrimination
have been found preempted.1 4 Contract claims found preempted in-
lude those arising out of damages for delays,3 5 loss of luggage, ' or
failure to transport due to removal or diversion.7
The only means of escaping the Convention's preemptive scope is
to establish that the claim arises out of an event that did not take
place during the transportation or the process of embarking or dis-
embarking.238 The interesting issue that emerges centers upon claims
for injuries that might have arisen after the transportation was com-
233. See Askier, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 619 (preempting claims for defamation, false
arrest and assault under state law, based on disturbances over seat assignments and
detention by airline service employees); Hermano, 1999 WL 1269187, at *5-6
(holding that defamation and other willful or reckless acts were preempted tinder
Warsaw).
234. See Turturro v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 181-82
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a discrimination claim under Air Carrier Access Act
was preempted).
235. See Perralta v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. C 98-1252, 1999 WL
193393, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1999) (stating that a breach of contract claim for
delay resulting in the loss of a business deal was governed exclusively by the War-
saw Convention); Minhas v. Biman Bangladesh Airlines, 1999 WL 447445, at
**2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999) (stating that claims arising from delay due to
"bumping" were governed by the Warsaw Convention); Daniel v. Virgin Atd. Ltd.,
59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (concluding that passengers' inconven-
ience as a resulting delay was a legally cognizable harm under the Convention);
Obuzor v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, No. 98 CIV 0224, 1999 WL 223162, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999) (holding that the Convention imposes liability upon
carriers for damages caused by delay in transportation of passengers).
236. See Spanner v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C 97-2972, 1998 WL 196466, at
**2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1998) (holding that the Warsaw Convention is inappli-
cable to a loss of luggage because of the liability provision, Article 18(1), which
requires that a loss of baggage take place during air transport); see also Cruz, 193
F.3d at 530 (stating that a common law claim for fraudulent denial of lost luggage
was preempted by the Warsaw Convention).
237. See Donkor, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (describing a passenger's detainment
and deportation during layover).
238. See id. at 968 (holding that plaintiff's causes of action are governed by Ar-




pleted, but which relate to an in-flight event. For instance, a state
claim was asserted against an airline for breach of "a post-crash duty
of care" following an aborted take off, crash, and fire.!" In another, a
party alleged that a passenger sustained injuries following the flight
crew's forced opening of a locked lavatory due to a smoke alarm."'
Moreover, in a lost luggage case, a state claim for deceit and/or mis-
representation was made as to claims arising from representations
after the transportation was completed!" There likewise have been
attempts to assert assorted state based claims for false arrest and ma-
licious prosecution following a passenger's arrest and/or removal
from the aircraft.242 In all of these cases, the court found that the
Convention preempted the state based claims.
A small number of cases have, however, been more limited in
their application of Warsaw's exclusivity. The Southern District of
New York recently held that alleged communications between airline
personnel and local police pertaining to a passenger's demand to be
let off the airplane and which resulted in the passenger's placement
in a psychiatric emergency room were actionable under state law. z
Although the communications pertained to an on-board event, the
fact that the communications were made after the passenger disem-
barked was found determinative.! Similarly, a Florida Appeals court
refused to apply Warsaw's exclusivity to a passenger's claim for
damages after she was forced off the plane and searched at the re-
quest or instigation of airport personnel.:"" The court found disposi-
239. See Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.. 854 F. Supp. 654, 663 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (asserting a state law claim for a post-crash duty of care).
240. See Laor v. Air France, 31 F. Supp. 2d 247. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
241. See Cruz, 193 F.3d at 530 (holding that the Convention preempts state law
claims).
242. See Garcia v. Aerovias De Mexico. S.A.. 896 F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (S.D.
Fla. 1995) (stating that state law claims for intentional torts are preempted by the
Warsaw Convention); see also Singh v. Tarom Romanian Transp., 88 F. Supp. 2d
62, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that "plaintiffs concede perhaps unwisely that the
Convention governs their malicious prosecution claims.").
243. See Turturro, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
244. See id. at 180-82.
245. See Zuliana de Aviacion v. Herrera, 763 So. 2d 499 (Fl. App. Ct. 20J4j.
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tive the fact that the injuries occurred after disembarkation.24"
Nonetheless, the majority of courts have been mindful of Tseng's
admonition that to allow parties to pursue claims covered by the
Convention would "encourage artful pleading by plaintiffs seeking to
opt out of the Convention's liability scheme when local law prom-
ised recovery in excess of that prescribed by the [Convention]. 24 7 So
long as the underlying event arises out of or occurred during the air
transportation or process of embarking or disembarking, the courts
were careful not to allow the Convention to be circumvented. 4 ? As
two recent decisions held in separate scenarios, "[t]he precipitating
cause of 'the accident' cannot be artificially separated from its results
in order to avoid the Warsaw Convention. 2 9 In Choukroun v.
American Airlines Inc.,25° for instance, various state claims such as
false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negli-
gence arose out of the diversion of the flight and the plaintiffs re-
moval as a result of a purported smoking incident."' The event at is-
sue took place during the flight and, regardless of whether it
constituted an "accident" or the fact that the arrest and prosecution
came later, was not sufficient to elude the Convention's exclusiv-
ity.
2 5 2
The generally broad preemptive scope of the Convention places
great stress upon Article 17 as whether or not an event is an accident
will determine whether the claimant has any remedy at all. The re-
sulting pressure upon courts to provide a claimant a remedy could
246. See id.
247. Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161 n.3 (citing Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d
881, 886 (5th Cir. 1996)).
248. See Laor, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 347; Cruz, 193 F.3d at 527.
249. Laor, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 347; Cruz, 193 F.3d at 531 (holding that fraud and
deceit claims were preempted, as "[t]he relationship between the occurrence that
[caused the] injuries is so closely related to the loss of luggage itself as to be, in a
sense, indistinguishable from it."). In Choukroun, the issue was whether the inci-
dent was an "accident", as plaintiff did not assert a claim under the Convention and
any such claim was barred by the two year statute of limitations under the Con-
vention. See Choukroun v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 98-12557-NG (D. Mass.
Aug. 2, 2000) (order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
250. See Choukr-oun, No. 98-12557-NG.




well lead to an unsupportable broadening of "accident." As a result,
the need for courts to properly interpret and apply accident as well as
the need for the term to be addressed textually becomes paramount.
B. ACCIDENT
1. Saks v. Air France
a. The Supreme Court's Decision
The leading case in the United States as to Article 17's "accident"
requirement is the 1985 decision, Saks v. Air France.!" Ms. Saks was
a passenger on an international flight between France and Los An-
geles, California. 2  As the aircraft descended, Ms. Saks felt extreme
pressure and pain in her left ear25' and suffered permanent deafness as
a result.2 '6 It is important to note, however, that she did not base her
claim on abnormal operation of the aircraft, but conceded that the
cabin depressurization was functioning properly at the time.2'" De-
spite this fact, Ms. Saks claimed that the normal pressurization
changes during descent caused her deafness and constituted an acci-
dent under Article 17.'s
The District Court ruled that Ms. Saks could not recover under
Article 17, as she could not demonstrate some malfunction or ab-
normality in the aircraft's operation.5' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 260 The Court held that a showing of a malfunction or ab-
normality in the aircraft's operation was not a prerequisite to liability
253. 470 U.S. 392 (1985). Other countries have adopted Saks with little discus-
sion. See, e.g., Quinn v. Canadian Airlines Int'l Ltd., [1994] 18 O.R.3d 326 (rely-
ing on Saks' holding that turbulence was not considered an accident under the
Convention).
254. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id. (stating that "all the available evidence, including the post flight re-
port, affidavits, and passenger testimony, indicated that the aircraft's pressurization
system had operated in the usual manner.").
258. See id. at 395.
259. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 395.
260. See Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384.
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under the Convention. 26' According to the Ninth Circuit, an accident
is defined as "an occurrence associated with the operation of aircraft
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft
with the intention of flight and all such persons have disem-
barked .... ,262 Thus, under this definition, a normal cabin depres-
surization qualifies as an accident."' Central to the Ninth Circuit's
analysis was its reliance on the "history and policy" of Annex 13 to
the Convention on International Aviation and the Montreal Interim
Agreement of 1966, which, according to the Court, allowed "acci-
dent" to be equated with "occurrence." 2"
The U. S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision.26' The Court held that an "accident" is an "unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.""2 ' Thus,
when "the injury indisputably results from the passenger's own in-
ternal reaction to the usual, normal and expected operation of the air-
craft it has not been caused by an accident, and Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention cannot apply. 26 7 The Court admonished that the
definition was to be applied "flexibly," and "after assessment of all
the circumstances;" that the inquiry should address "the nature of the
event which caused the injury rather than the care taken by the airline
to avert the injury;" and that the passenger need only prove "that
some link in the chain was an unusual and unexpected event external
to the passenger., 26 ' Further, the Court considered the inquiry to be
"an objective one, which does not focus on the perspective of the
261. See id. at 1396 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit based its decision on the
Montreal Agreement's view, which imposes absolute liability on airlines for inju-
ries proximately caused by inherent risks in travel).
262. Id. at 1385.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 396.
266. Id. at 405.
267. Id. at 406. In reaching this definition, the Court found the text of Article 17
to be "stark and undefined". See id. at 399. The Court resorted to the Convention's
structure, the meaning that the binding French team might have intended for the
negotiators, the subsequent conduct of the parties, and applicable foreign prece-
dent. See id. at 399-400.
268. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 393.
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person experiencing the injury." Not surprisingly, the Saks defini-
tion has been readily adopted by other countries with virtually no
analysis.27
Crucial to Saks is that the Court defined the issue before it as a
"narrow" one: 271 "whether [Ms. Saks] can meet [her burden of proof]
by showing that her injury was caused by the normal operation of the
aircraft's pressurization system."2:2 In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning that equated "occurrence" with "accident,", the Court
stated: "it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition
rather than the occurrence of the injury alone."2 The Court also
found that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on both the Annex and the
Montreal Agreement to be misplaced.:" According to the Court, the
elimination of the "all necessary measures" defense did not consti-
tute a waiver of the other provisions of the Convention such as the
"accident" requirement of Article 17, which had a separate and dis-
tinct meaning and intention.'"
b. The Aftermath of Saks
The Saks formulation of the standard has not been uniformly ap-
plied. Some Courts have not questioned whether the "unusual or un-
expected" event requires any causal connection or relationship to air-
craft operation or procedures, or constitutes an "inherent risk of air
269. Id. at 392.
270. See Naval-Torres v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., [1998] 159 D.L.R.4th 67;
Quinn v. Canadian Airlines, [1994] 18 O.R.3d 325. ql.'d, O.J. No. 1832, apphca-
tion for leave to appeal dismissed (1997) S.C.J., No. 354. Interestingly, the court in
Naval-Torres addressed whether a passenger's exposure to second-hand smoke
was an accident, and found that the carrier's failure to provide an adequate %entila-
tion system to avoid the circulation of second-hand smoke in the non-smoking
section met the definition of accident under Sakl. See Naval-Torres, [1998] 159
D.L.R. 4th 67, para. 22. The court noted that "accident" encompassed inadvertent,
negligent and intentional acts. See id. at 14-15.
271. Saks, 470 U.S. at 396.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. Id. at 399.
275. See id. at 405-07.
276. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 407.
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travel. 277 An examination of the Saks' holding, in the context of the
limited factual dispute before it, discloses that the Supreme Court did
not intend to expand "accident" beyond the intent of the drafters,
eliminate the need for there to be a connection between the injury
producing event and an aspect of aviation or aircraft operation, or
render all passenger upon passenger torts actionable.2 8 Indeed, Saks
adopted a restrictive, rather than an expansive definition of "acci-
dent. 2 7' According to the First Circuit, "[t]his restraint is entirely un-
derstandable as Article 17 provides for strict liability and there are
sound policy reasons to confine that liability to the letter of the text,
narrowly construed."28
Lost by many decisions since Saks is the undisputed fact that the
abnormal operation of the aircraft was not at issue.28' It was agreed
that the pressure within the cabin was not the result of an aviation
abnormality or any abnormal operation or malfunction of the air-
craft.282 Clearly, if Ms. Saks' injury resulted from a malfunction or
abnormality in the pressurization system [whether negligent or not],
there would have been an accident under the Warsaw Convention, as
the abnormal depressurization would have been considered an unex-
pected aviation event.283 Contrary to many subsequent decisions, Saks
did not eliminate the need for there to be some relationship to avia-
tion or an abnormal or unusual operation of the aircraft, as the op-
277. See Daniel v. Virgin Atil. Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(holding that damages for inconvenience as a result of a delayed flight cannot be
compensated).
278. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (defining accident to be the cause of the injury,
not the occurrence of the injury in and of itself); Tseng, 525 U.S. at 158 (stating
that the drafters intended to allow passengers to "skirt [the conditions of air carrier
liability in Article 17]" to pursue claims under local law).
279. See McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1995)
(asserting that the Supreme Court generally interprets Article 17 "parsimoni-
ously"); McDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (Ist Cir. 1971) (holding
that the Convention requires an "accident" to occur during disembarkment).
280. McCarthy, 56 F.3d at 316.
281. See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (holding that routine pressurization of the cabin was not an "accident").
282. See id. at 401 (discussing the issue of whether a plaintiff's loss of hearing
during a flight was considered an "accident" under the Convention).
283. See id. at 413.
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eration of the aircraft was assumed or implicit in the decision.2' The
fact that the injury resulted from an aircraft operation-i.e., pressuri-
zation-left only the legal issue of whether the pressurization had to
be abnormal for there to be a Warsaw accident.2" The Court held that
it did.286
To read Saks as requiring that "accident" only requires an abnor-
mal or an unusual event-regardless of any connection with the air-
craft's operation or aviation-is to ignore both the context of the de-
cision and the intention of the drafters of the Convention. Air carriers
agreed to assume liability for aviation related accidents, not for every
injury that occurs on an aircraft or in the course of embarking or dis-
embarking, and certainly not injuries that result from the every day,
normal, expected operations of the aircraft and its personnel. As one
court has noted, "[t]o hold otherwise would be effectively to construe
the Convention as a statute imposing absolute liability for any harm-
ful occurrence on an international flight. There is neither a reason nor
authority for such a construction.
'2
17
While the Court in Saks did expressly acknowledge that "torts
committed by terrorists or fellow passengers"2" have been found to
be accidents by lower courts, the reference was unnecessary to the
limited facts presented and was not intended as an absolute proposi-
tion. Saks is simply not determinative as to whether torts or assaults
by passengers on fellow passengers are an accident under Article 17.
First, in referencing torts committed by fellow passengers, the
Court was not holding that all torts committed by fellow passengers
are "accidents," but only that the definition should be applied flexi-
bly "after assessment of all the circumstances" of the particular inci-
dent .2 " Depending on the circumstances, and particularly whether the
airline played a causal role in the tort or assault, an Article 17 acci-
dent could well exist, and whether the action was intentional or not is
284. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985).
285. See id.
286. See id. at 406.
287. Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D. Mass. 1998).
288. Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
289. Id.
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not determinative of whether an accident occurred. """ An airline's in-
volvement or causal role in any tort for assault may well be sufficient
abnormal operation to incur liability.
Second, the only citation made by the Supreme Court was to
Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Systems," ' an unreported Maryland
district court decision, which held that an accident occurred when a
passenger was injured as a result of another "drunken" passenger
falling on him. In Oliver, however, there was no discussion or men-
tion of any other circumstances.2 92 Certainly, if the offending passen-
ger was known to be drunk by airline personnel, over-served, or al-
lowed to walk about the aircraft when he or she should have been
seated, then an unusual or abnormal aircraft operation could have oc-
curred, justifying that finding.
Neither the Supreme Court's remark, nor reference to Oliver, sup-
ports the assertion that all torts committed by passengers upon other
passengers, especially intentional assaults, are accidents under War-
saw. Indeed, the First Circuit recently rejected such a notion, adopt-
ing flexible assessment and requiring a causal connection between
airline personnel and the passenger-on-passenger tort.""
2. A Strict Application of Saks
Despite the negotiating history behind Article 17 and the factual
context of Saks, a number of Courts have applied a strict interpreta-
tion of Saks. These courts view Saks as establishing a single test of
whether or not the injury producing event was unusual or unex-
pected. 9 4 Consideration of whether the event is an "inherent risk of
290. C'f id. at 406 (requiring only that the passenger prove that the injury was
caused by an unusual or unexpected event).
291. No. M-82-3057, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17951, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 5,
1983).
292. See id.
293. See Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2000)
(reversing a lower court's dismissal of a claim brought by a passenger asserting
that he was momentarily grabbed in the private area by another passenger where
the complaint contained allegations of over-service of alcohol).
294. See Gezzi v. British Airways, PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that water on stairs passes the unusual and unexpected test under Saks);
see also Barratt v. Trinidad & Tobago (BWIA Int'l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-
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air travel" or has a causal connection to abnormal aircraft operation
or service is immaterial. In Gezzi v. British Airways, PLC,: for ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit held that a passenger's fall due to the pres-
ence of water on the stairs of an embarking aircraft was an accident
even if the water had no relation to the operation of the aircraft. In
the court's view, the water was unexpected, unusual, and external to
the passenger. 2 96 Although the court acknowledged that water on the
stairs used to enter an aircraft did relate to the airplane's operation,
i.e., the process of embarking on the plane,' " it nonetheless ques-
tioned "whether an event's relationship to the operation of an aircraft
is relevant. ,,98
Similarly, in Barratt v. Trinidad & Tobago Airways, Corp., " the
court rejected the assertion that a stumble and fall inside an airplane
terminal could never constitute an accident. The court reasoned that
the plain language of Article 17 was not limited by any reference to
"risks inherent in aviation.""' This strict liability view is an over
simplistic reading of Saks and fails to consider the context and his-
tory of Article 17's adoption. Under this view, any event or happen-
ing, so long as unexpected, would result in liability. This would ren-
der carriers virtual insurers, which was not the intent of the
Convention."'
3. The Causal Connection or Relationship to Aircraji Operations
A large portion of the decisional law to date is less literal in its ap-
3945, 1990 WL 127590, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (referencing the Saks
test).
295. 991 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1993).
296. See id. at 605.
297. See id. (stating that "the presence of water on stairs that are used to provide
access to an airplane, unlike a fistfight between passengers, relates directly to the
process of embarking on the plane.").
298. Id. at 605 n.4 (noting that "[i]t is not clear whether an ev'ent's relationship
to the operation of an aircraft is relevant to whether the event is an 'accident."').
299. No. CV 88-3945, 1990 WL 27590. at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990).
300. Id. at *2.
301. The fall in Gezzi was unusual and unexpected but also related to the opera-
tion of the aircraft, as water on the steps of entry is an unusual aspect of the air-
craft's operating procedure of embarking. See Ge"z-i, 991 F.2d at 605.
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plication, and more in line with the intent behind the Convention.
The decisions have either expressly or implicitly referenced a causal
connection or relationship between the unusual event and the air-
craft's operation or procedures.3"2 A Warsaw accident has been found
to cover such injuries as those caused by the full recline of a seat
when the claimant sought and was denied assistance by airline per-
sonnel, °3 a prick by a hypodermic needle missed by air maintenance
personnel,3°  a stewardess' application of an overly hot compress,""
contact by a piece of galley equipment that had broken loose,"" a
spill of hot coffee,3 7 a fall relating to a boarding ramp," " poor cabin• 309
air, exposure to "bio-medical waste,"' ° failure of a tire on take-
off,"' and a slip and fall on an airplane's steps. "2
302. See Levy v. American Airlines, 1993 WL 205857, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1092 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that some relationship between
the accident and the operation of the aircraft is required under Article 17).
303. See Schneider v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 686 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D. Me. 1988)
(discussing the injury plaintiff suffered while attempting to get up from her seat
where the passenger in front of her refused to straighten the seat, and the flight at-
tendant would not assist the plaintiff); cf Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that flight attendant's refusal to
move asthmatic passenger, and follow company procedure as well as the recog-
nized standard of care, constituted an accident).
304. See Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana De Aviacion S.A. De C.V., 13 F. Supp. 2d
508, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Rothschild v. Tower Air, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2078, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995).
305. See Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1998).
306. See Gilbert v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 4157, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1715, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1989); cf Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch
Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that a sales trolley
striking and injuring plaintiffs knee was the result of an accident).
307. See Lugo v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D.P.R. 1988).
308. See Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611, 613
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
309. See Dias v. Transbrasil Airlines, Inc., 26 Av. Cas. (CCH) 16,048 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
310. See Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., I ll F. Supp. 2d 501, 506
(D.N.J. 2000).
311. See Arkin v. Trans Int'l Airlines, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 11, 12 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
312. See Gezzi v. British Airways, PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that since water was present on the airplane's steps, the fall was an acci-
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No "accident" has been found where the passenger claimed an in-
jury as a result of a normal landing,3' a passenger was not served in-
flight meal after takeoff,"' a prolonged sitting due to delay,"' an at-
tempt to avoid a sleeping passenger, " ' passengers sitting in improper
seats, ' 7 or the passenger's own excessive consumption of alcohol.'"'
Turbulence cases can have varying outcomes, depending on whether
it was unusual or unexpected under the circumstances. '
While many of these, and other decisions, do not specifically ref-
erence or discuss the need for the unusual event or happening to con-
cem some aspect of the aircraft's operation, such an element is im-
plicit. For instance, where a passenger is injured as a result of
abnormal pressurization changes, a sudden dive,' unusual turbu-
lence, emergencies, evacuation,2' harsh landings," or unusual en-
dent as it involved the process of embarking).
313. See Salce v. Aer Lingus Air Lines, No. 84 Civ. 3444, 1985 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20215, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1985).
314. See Farm v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 00-67, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8824, at *1, 9 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2000) (concluding that "'the service of the plain-
tiff's meal at the same time the other passengers* meals were served was not, how-
ever, an 'unexpected or unusual event.'").
315. See Margrave v. British Airways, 643 F. Supp. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
316. See Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1996); see also
Craig v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, No. 93-55263. 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
37038, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1994) (holding that a passenger falling over shoes
is not unexpected or unusual, and, therefore, not an accident).
317. See Toteja v. British Airlines, No. JFM-99-815, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17374, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 9, 1999).
318. See Padilla v. Olympic Airways. 765 F. Supp. 835, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
319. See Quinn v. Canadian Airlines Int'l, Ltd., [1994] 48 A.C.W.S.3d 222
(finding that turbulence between Toronto and Florida was not severe enough to be
unexpected or unusual and, therefore, not an accident); see also Simmons v.
American Airlines, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 571 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 18, 2001)
(finding turbulence claim actionable under Warsaw).
320. See Weintraub v. Capital Int'l Airways. Inc., 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,0858
(N.Y. 1980) (holding that an aircraft's sudden steep dive and swerve to the nght
constituted an accident).
321. See Tavarez v. American Airlines, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1997); Sanna v. Delta Airlines, 132 F.R.D. 47, 48-49 (N.D.
Ohio 1990); Hinds v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10638, at *I
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1979).
322. See Mathias v. Pan-Am. World Airways, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 447, 448-49
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gine noise,"' the abnormality of the aircraft operation element is ob-
viously present and understandable. Other cases have expressly
stated that the unusual event required by Saks must be an abnormal
operation of the aircraft.1 4 The Second Circuit, in turn, has held that
an injury resulting from routine airline procedures carried out in any
abnormal way can be an accident.325
Another class of cases directly related to the passenger-upon-
passenger misconduct scenario are those involving injuries resulting
from airline services or facilities. These cases include such events as
the spilling of hot beverages, bones in meals,326 and excessive service
of alcohol.327 Again, it is either the abnormality in the routine service
or the causal connection to carrier activities that forms the basis for a
finding of a Warsaw accident.
The more difficult borderline cases in this category involve seem-
ingly minor interactions between passengers, and as well as those
between passengers and crew. For instance, where passengers claim
injuries as a result of removing or storing baggage, or avoiding other
passengers, there may or may not be an accident depending upon the
circumstances. In Gotz v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,32" a passenger claimed
a Warsaw accident occurred when he attempted to remove an over-
head bag and had to move to avoid a passenger who suddenly arose
from his seat. The court in Gotz employed a precise and appropri-
ately focused analysis by determining whether there was: (a) an un-
(W.D. Pa. 1971); Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1191-92 (D.
Mont. 1999).
323. See Manion v. American Airlines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1997)
(stating that whether engine noise is unusual for purposes of Article 17 is a ques-
tion of fact).
324. See Gotz v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D. Mass. 1998).
325. See Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
326. See Bousso v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana, No. 96-CV-9094, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3939, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1998); Rhodes v. American Air-
lines, Inc., No. 96-CV-3583, 1996 WL 1088897, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1996)
(holding that ingestion of fish bone during in-flight meal is an accident); Halmos v.
Pan-Am. World Airways, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 122, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying
the Warsaw Convention's two year statute of limitations to a passenger's claim
that he suffered food poisoning from an in-flight meal).
327. See Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2000).
328. 12 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
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usual or unexpected event that was external to claimant and, if so, (b)
whether the event was a malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's
operation. 2 The court ultimately found that no accident had occurred
because the event was neither unusual nor unexpected,'" and did not
result from an unusual or abnormal aircraft event.'
In Brandt v. American Airlines, Inc.,'- a federal district court in
California held that there was no accident where a passenger claimed
he was injured after a flight attendant pushed him down into his seat
while clearing the aisle in order to evacuate an injured passenger.
The court found that, under the circumstances, it was neither unusual
nor unexpected that a flight attendant might physically touch a pas-
senger in order to ensure that the passenger is seated and in order to
clear the aisle. The court also found that statements by the pilot and
flight attendant to the passenger... were not unusual or unexpected
under the circumstances and, therefore, did not constitute an acci-
dent.3 4 Similarly, a passenger's fall over a carry-on bag left in the
aisle of a plane was not found to be an accident, as there was nothing
unexpected about the bag's presence in or near the aisle during the
boarding process.": Moreover, an argument over seating was found
not to be an accident, nor was a passenger's confrontation with a
rude, hostile fellow passenger in a fully reclined seat.'
329. See id. at 201-02.
330. See id. at 205 (stating that a passenger's sudden rise from his or her seat
while the aircraft was parked at the gate was not unusual).
331. See id. at 203 (holding that the actions of the aisle-seated passenger do not
fall within the scope of the aircraft's operation).
332. 2000 WL 288393, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2000).
333. See id. (explaining the airline personnel's statements regarding the passen-
ger's failure to sit down and his possible arrest for not cooperating with the flight
attendant).
334. See id.
335. See Sethy v. Maleu-Hungarian Airlines. Inc., 2000 WL 1234660 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 30, 2000) (finding no evidence to support the assertion that a flight attendant
had been asked to help, but refused to do so, and awarding summary judgment for
the carrier when the plaintiff claimed to have suftered a Warsaw accident by trip-
ping over a bag); see also Got:, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (finding that the mere failure
of a flight attendant to intervene-absent notice or a request to do so-is insuffi-
cient to render the event an accident).
336. See Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc.. 98 F.3d 881, 883-884 (5th Cir. 1996);
Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1999 WL 562244 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1999)
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Where a similar injury results from unexpected or unusual flight
crew involvement, however, courts have held that an accident did
occur. In Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 7 a district court found that
an accident had occurred due to a series of actions by a flight atten-
dant, including preventing the claimant passenger and his children
from changing seats, engaging in a heated argumentative exchange,
informing the passenger he would be arrested, and publicly humili-
ating him on board the aircraft. "8 Where a flight attendant refused to
move an asthmatic passenger despite repeated requests, and falsely
told the passenger that there were no other seats in which to lay
down, a court also found that an "accident" took place.3 9 The court
admonished that "[w]hen a passenger boards an airplane, he or she
should be able to expect that the flight crew comply with accepted
procedures and rules. A failure to do so is unexpected.,
4 0
It is clear from these cases that service from flight attendants and
other air personnel has a direct relation to the operation of an aircraft.
Accordingly, where a passenger is injured as a result of conduct or
actions of airline personnel, which are outside the scope of normal
aircraft expectations, procedures, events, or operations, an aviation
accident occurs.34' Conversely, actions or failures to act by flight at-
tendants or other air personnel that are normal, expected, and not un-
usual in the operation of the aircraft are not actionable. 4 This ap-
proach is in keeping with the understanding that liability under the
Warsaw scheme was meant to cover aviation accidents and not ren-
(granting defendant airline's request for summary judgment when two passengers
had engaged in a hostile confrontation, since the event was not an accident within
the scope of the Warsaw Convention); see also Craig v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 45 F.3d 435, 1994 WL 711916 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1994) (finding a passen-
ger's fall over shoes not to be an accident, since it was neither unexpected nor un-
usual).
337. 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Or. 1999).
338. See Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F.Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (D. Or. 1999).
339. See Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1121 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
340. Id. at 1134.
341. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
342. See Gotz v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 200 (D. Mass. 1998)
(finding that no accident occurred where a flight attendant failed to intervene with-
out notice or a request to do so).
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der carriers insurers for all injuries that take place in an aircraft."'
This does not mean, however, that the interpretation or application of
an accident engrafts a due care or negligent standard for liability. To
the contrary, the element of abnormal operation of the aircraft does
not require that the abnormality or unusual event be either negligent
or fault based. The injury, however, must result from or have a rela-
tion to the abnormal operation of the aircraft to be actionable.
Other hybrid interactions between flight personnel and passengers
that pose difficulties include: delays," searches, diversions, deten-
tions,'" passenger removals,4' and arrests. In El A/ Israel Airlines,
Inc. v. Tseng, for example, a search was at issue. " The airline sub-
jected a passenger to an intrusive search pursuant to established pre-
boarding security procedures when a guard considered the passenger
to be a high security risk. The Second Circuit held that the security
search was a "routine" part of international air travel and, thus, not
an unexpected or unusual event."' According to the court, the risk of
mistakes-that innocent persons will be erroneously searched-is
"inherent to any effort to detect malefactors.""" Security precautions
343. See Chendrimada v. Air-India, 802 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that one of the purposes of the Warsaw treaty was to limit potential acci-
dent liability for the carrier).
344. See id. at 1089 (stating that whether an eleven-hour detainment aboard an
aircraft constitutes an accident is a question of fact).
345. See Singh v. Tarom Romanian Air Transp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 62 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (questioning whether plaintiffs detention in the customs area met the re-
quirements of Article 17); Shen v. Japan Airlines, 918 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), affd, 43 F.3d 1459 (2d Cir. 1994): Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines, 8 F.3d
164 (4th Cir. 1993).
346. See Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.. 1999 WL 562244, at *13 (E.D. Pa.
July 30, 1999). In Grines, a passenger and the flight crew had a verbal dispute
over a seat assignment that resulted in the arrest of the passenger by police for dis-
orderly conduct. See id. at * 13. The court found that an argument over seating is
neither unexpected nor unusual, especially given that the claimant refused to move
to another seat. See id. Further, removal from an airplane was not an accident, as
the passenger refused to do so when ordered by the captain. See hi. According to
the court, "[i]t does not matter if it was the Captain's decision that initiated the
chain of events leading to the arrest, the fact remains that it was entirely within
Grimes' control whether he was arrested." Id.
347. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 155.
348. See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 103.
349. Id.
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such as searches are expected, routine, and a usual aspect of interna-
tional travel. If conducted pursuant to customs and procedures, a se-
curity search is not unexpected or unusual even if the searched pas-
senger claims injury or is not a safety threat.'"0
Although the sole issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in
Tseng was the issue of exclusivity, the High Court did state that "[i]t
is questionable whether the Court of Appeals 'flexibly applied' the
definition of 'accident' as set forth in Saks. ' '" 1 What the Court may
have had in mind is that while a security search may be routine, if
applied erroneously, it is an unexpected event creating liability under
Warsaw. 52 Such a view, however, is problematic and contrary to
limiting a carrier's liability.
Removals, diversions, and arrests may or may not be considered
accidents, depending upon the circumstances. 35 While a crew mem-
ber's relationship to the operation of the aircraft is clear, given his or
her involvement, special circumstances must be present to establish
that the involvement was abnormal or unusual. Similar to a search,
an accident may occur where a crew member undertakes an arrest,
removal, or diversion contrary to established procedures. When a
passenger acts in such a manner requiring arrest, removal, or diver-
sion, however, the event is not unexpected, unusual, or external to
the passenger. In such cases, it is reasonable and consistent with the
terms and purposes of the Convention that liability turn on the rea-
350. Cf Zuliana de Aviacion v. Herrera, 763 So. 2d 499 (Fla. App. Ct. 2000)
(finding a passenger's claim for damages, after forced off plane and searched, not
preempted by Warsaw as injuries occurred after passenger was removed from
plane).
351. Tseng, 525 U.S. at 158.
352. See Shen v. Japan Airlines, 918 F. Supp. 686, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating
that detention, search, seizure, delay, and arrest were an accident, but dismissing
the claim since the Court lacked jurisdiction). But see Buonocore v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1990) (declining to find the airline liable for
the death of a ticket holder from a terrorist attack when the ticket holder was not in
an advanced state of boarding the plane and had not gone through security inspec-
tion).
353. See Garcia v. Aerovias de Mexico, S.A., 896 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (S.D. Fl.
1995) (discussing whether an accident occurred when a passenger was falsely ac-
cused of being a thief by a flight attendant).
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sonableness of the airlines' actions."
4. The Inherent Risks of Air Travel
Another view referenced both before and after Saks is that an Arti-
cle 17 accident must involve a "risk inherent or characteristic to air
travel." While the exact origins of this meaning are not particularly
clear-including whether it is meant to be synonymous with aircraft
operation-it is derivative of the drafters' intent to have the Conven-
tion pertain to aviation accidents. It was not the intention of the
drafters, however, to have the carrier responsible for all risks associ-
ated with air travel or those inherent with any common carrier. In-
deed, the Convention eschews a risk based scheme rather than one
based on fault:"' The drafters believed that a passenger utilizing air
transportation was accepting the accompanying "risks".' In impos-
ing liability for "accidents," the drafters envisioned injuries arising
out of the hazards of flying related to the abnormal operation of the
aircraft, rather than the traditional risks undertaken by a common
carrier.3'5
The "risk inherent to air travel" view became especially prominent
354. The Tokyo Convention is also very relevant to these cases. See The Con-
vention of Offenses and Certain Other Acts Coinitted on Board ..Iircrlft, Sept. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention]. The United States ratified the Tokyo Convention in 1969. It was in-
tended to oblige member States to "take such measures as may be necessary to es-
tablish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed on board
aircraft registered in such State." Id. art. Ill, sec. 2. The Tokyo Convention also
covers "acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good or-
der and discipline on board." Id. art. I, sec. I, cl. b. The agreement immunizes the
aircraft's commander, crew, and even passengers who utilize "reasonable meas-
ures" where there are "reasonable grounds to believe that such action is immedi-
ately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property
therein." Id. art. VI, sec. 2.
355. See 1929 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 45, at 21: GOEDHUIS, supra note
40, at 197-237 (discussing generally the rejection of a risk based approach to li-
ability for air carriers).
356. See GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 236: GIEMLULLA, supra note 150, at 11-12.
357. See Rullman v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (stating that in order for an event to constitute an accident
under the Warsaw Convention, it must arise out of a nsk that is "peculiar to air
travel").
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after the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966'5 for personal injuries
resulting from highjackings,359 bomb threats,
60 or terrorist attacks.16 1
These events are clearly intentional criminal acts and pose a difficult
"textual" question as to whether they constitute "accidents" under
Article 17. The courts, however, eschewed a textual analysis empha-
sizing that the drafters of the Convention were concerned with air
crashes and similar "hazards of air travel." As such, hijackings and
terrorist attacks were deemed "hazards of air travel." These same
courts found the Montreal Interim Agreement's waiver of Article
20's "all necessary measures" defense as establishing absolute liabil-
ity. Therefore, pursuant to "policy considerations," the Convention
modified and redistributed the costs involved in air transportation,
and placed the carrier in the best position of assessing and insuring
against these inherent risks associated with air travel.
Interestingly, the Court in Saks made no express reference to any
risk allocation and, in fact, rejected the notion that the Montreal In-
terim Agreement of 1966 affected Article 17's intention of estab-
358. See Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 58.
359. See Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975);
Pflug v. Egypt Aircorp, 961 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1992); Krystal v. British Overseas
Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1975); see also Stanford v.
Kuwait Airways Corp., 648 F. Supp. 657, 660 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (agreeing that a
hijacking constitutes an accident under Warsaw); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nation-
ale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acknowledging that the
Warsaw Convention covers injuries arising out of terrorist attacks).
360. See Salerno v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 656, 657
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a miscarriage caused by a bomb was an unexpected
and unusual event that was outside the normal operation of the aircraft); Margrave
v. British Airways, 643 F. Supp. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that extended
sitting on an airplane due to a bomb threat "cannot be characterized as the sort of
accident that triggers liability under the Convention.").
361. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co. Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Day, 528 F.2d at 31 (involving a terrorist attack at Hellenikon Airport in
Athens, Greece); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.
1977); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1978).
It is noteworthy that the early 1960s witnessed a rise in the crime of hijackings. See
generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aerial Piracy and Terrorism: Unilateral and
Multilateral Responses to Aircraft Hijackings, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427, 429
(1987); Jamie L. Rhee, Comment, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Air-
line Safety in the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 847, 851 (2000)
(noting that there were forty-six hijackings between 1960 and 1967).
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lishing absolute liability."2 Moreover, while the Court in Saks did not
make express reference to any notion of risks characteristic to air
travel, it did reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision referencing the
normal depressurization on an aircraft as a "hazard of air travel.""
This, in turn, is consistent with the intention of the Convention's
drafters, who had made the conscious effort not to adopt a risk based
liability standard, but actually intended that passengers accept typical
risks related to air carriage.
As a result, one could argue that the Supreme Court was rejecting
"a risk inherent to air travel" view, especially when Ms. Saks had
expressed such a view in her Supreme Court brief. On the other
hand, by holding that injuries resulting from normal-as opposed to
abnormal-aircraft operations are not recoverable, the Court was
equating abnormal operations with air risks assumed by the carrier. If
the injury did not result from aircraft operations outside the normal
and routine, it did not result from the type of risks for which the car-
rier should be liable. In Maxwell v. Aer Lingus, ' for example, a dis-
trict court held that an injury caused by liquor bottles dislodged from
an overhead bin was an accident, notwithstanding the fact that the
airline had warned passengers about shifting overhead items. In so
holding, the court made it clear that an accident under Warsaw must
have a connection to aircraft operation and that the risk posed by
stowed items was a risk characteristic of air travel.""
It is worth noting that the "inherent risk of air travel" approach has
not been extended to terrorist attacks in airports or other events or
happenings. In Martinez-Hernandez v. Air France,'" the First Circuit
found that Article 17 liability did not apply to a terrorist attack within
an airport and rejected the assertion that such an attack was a "char-
362. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 393.
363. Id. at 395.
364. 122 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2000).
365. See id. at 211 (stating that "[w]hile a reasonable passenger would expect
some shifting of the contents of an overhead bin, particularly during a turbulent
flight, she would not expect, as an ordinary incident of the operation of the aircraft,
to be struck on the head by a falling object when the bin above her seat is opened
by a fellow passenger.").
366. 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976).
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acteristic of air travel. 367 Indeed, the court stated that
[u]nlike the risk of hijacking. . . where the aircraft and the fact of air
travel are prerequisites to the crime, we think the risk of a random attack
such as that which gave rise to this litigation is not a risk characteristic of
travel by aircraft, but rather a risk of living in a world such as ours.161
Similarly, in Rullman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,'6 the
fainting of a passenger ten feet from the doorway of an aircraft was
deemed to not be an accident, as the injury was not "a risk inherent
in modem air travel.' ' 7 ' This notion, by perforce, applies to passenger
assaults and torts.
In Curley v. American Airlines, Inc.,'7 a New York District Court
held that "the highly unusual happenstance" of being detained and
searched by Mexican authorities after being identified by the plane
captain as smoking marijuana in the airplane lavatory was "hardly a
characteristic of air travel, 3 and not an accident within the meaning
of Article 17. Another New York District Court found that "the risk
that airline personnel will smuggle a passenger onto an international
flight in violation of a court order, or will otherwise commit inten-
tional torts against a passenger, likewise hardly constitutes a 'risk in-
herent to air travel.'
373
These cases are consistent with the Convention's intention.
Moreover, terrorist hijackings and bombing activities that are "acci-
367. Id. at 284.
368. Id. at 284. The issue of terrorists attacks and hijackings have received little
analysis as to why and how they meet the intention and meaning of an accident.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text. The rationale in Martinez is equally
applicable to such terrorist events, as they are not in anyway unique to air travel
but are risks present in many aspects of modem life.
369. 471 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
370. See also Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 448
(holding that plaintiff's injuries did not constitute an accident under Warsaw since
they arose out of the "ordinary, anticipated, and required programmed changes in
the aircraft's operation, all of which were performed purposefully under the careful
control of the plane's crew in the normal and prudent course of flight con-
trol .... ).
371. 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
372. Id. at 283.
373. Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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dents" are not directly analogous to passenger upon passenger torts.
While hijackings have a relationship to the operation of the aircraft,
air travel, and global airline security practices" passenger upon pas-
senger assaults or torts that have no substantial airline complicity do
not involve the aircraft operation or the type of "risk" for which car-
rier's were to assume liability. Indeed, such assaults or torts are a
"risk of living in a world such as ours"'"' and, thus, no different than
any other type of risk that could occur in a public place.
5. Medical Aid Claims
Medical aid cases are yet another class of cases causing conster-
nation in the courts. In this scenario, a passenger is stricken with a
health problem such as a heart attack, asthma, or a stroke, and it is
claimed that the flight crew did not act appropriately in providing aid
or in diverting the flight. It is recognized that a health condition is
not an accident unless triggered by an unusual or unexpected event
such as a passenger suffering a heart attack during a sudden dive or
emergency landing. The difficulty occurs, however, when the medi-
cal condition occurs during an uneventful flight and the passenger
claims that the actions or inactions of flight personnel aggravated the
condition. 376
Both the Third and Eleventh Circuits have found these instances
not to be accidents on the rationale that any failure of the flight crew
resulting in the aggravation of the injury is not an "unusual or unex-
pected happening." In Kri's v. Lufthansa German Airlines,"" for ex-
374. See Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.. 446 N.Y.S.2d 397, 39S (N,Y.
App. Div. 1982), affd, 440 N.E.2d 1339 (N.Y. 1982) (analogizing the failure of
the crewrmembers to provide medical aid with hijacking cases. stating that it "is not
the act of the hijackers but the alleged failure of the carrier to provide adequate se-
curity" that was the cause of the injury).
375. Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 284 (0st Cir. 197t) (re-
quiring a close and logical nexus between the injury and air tra\ el per se).
376. See Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515. 1515 (llth Cir.
1997); Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co.. 739 F.2d 130, 130 (3d Cir. 1984. cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985) (dismissing claims under the \Varsaw% Convention
because the failure of crewmembers to provide the plaintiff with an area to lie
down so that he could administer "self-help" for a pre-existing paraesophageal
hiatal hernia was not an accident within the meaning of the Convention).
377. 119 F.3d at 1515.
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ample, the passenger claimant suffered a heart attack during the
flight and alleged that the carrier was negligent in the handling of the
attack after it had occurred.7 The court, however, refused to look at
the assertion of crew negligence as opposed to the underlying factual
event. 79 As such, the court found that the continuation of the flight
caused the aggravation of the injury and, thus, the incident could not
be considered an unexpected or unusual happening or event."" Only
one other reported decision to date has held otherwise in finding that
a flights crew's negligent failure to render medical assistance to a
passenger who suffered a heart attack was an "accident." ''
All of the other decisions, including Krys, that have found no "ac-
cident" under Article 17 for medical aid cases did so before the ex-
clusivity holding in Tseng. These cases all held that the claimant
could pursue remedies under state law. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Krvs
recovered $2.4 million in damages. Under Tseng, however, such a
plaintiff would have no remedy at all. One court decision, decided
after both Kiys and Tseng, noted this to be "absurd" stating:
The result of the union of Krys and Tseng is a dissolution of an airline's
378. See id. at 1515 (stating passenger's allegation "that crew negligently failed
to make unscheduled landing at available airports on east coast in response to pas-
senger's systems and this aggravated damage to his heart.").
379. See id. at 1521-22.
380. See Tandon v. United Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 366, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1064, 1065 (N.D. I11. 1985);
Walker v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 111, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (conced-
ing that there was not a Warsaw accident in an allegation that inadequate care ag-
gravated the medical condition); Scherer v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 387
N.Y.S.2d 580, 580 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (alleging that the prolonged sitting in an
airline seat caused thrombophlebitis); Farra v. American Airlines, Inc. 2000 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 8824 (E.D. Pa., June 28, 2000) (finding that illness allegedly resulting
from failure to serve in-flight meal after take-off not recoverable under Warsaw);
Chaudhari v. British Airways, Inc., THE TIMEs, 7 May 1997 (transcript Smith Ber-
nal) (partially paralyzed passenger fell while going to lavatory).
381. See Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 446 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982); cf Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (finding that an accident had occurred due to failures by the crew when a
passenger inhaled second hand smoke in the nonsmoking part of the airplane,
thereby aggravating his asthma and ultimately resulting in death). But see Rajcooar
v. Air India, Ltd., 89 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding a heart attack that
occurred on board an airplane was not an accident); McDowell v. Continental Air-
lines, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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duty of care to its passengers so long as the cause of a passenger's initial
injury is internal to the passenger himself. This holds true so long as the
airline takes no affirmative action which aggravates the injury. Complete
inaction is acceptable, even if in doing nothing the airline aggravates the
passenger's injury.
It is simply incongruous to hold that a carrier is not liable for fail-
ing to take any actions to aid a passenger stricken with a medical
condition, but is liable for passenger upon passenger torts. After all,
it is certainly consistent with the Warsaw scheme to find, "after as-
sessment of all the circumstances" that an "accident" occurs when a
flight crew does not make reasonable efforts to assist stricken pas-
sengers. Such action or inaction, if contrary to established airline
procedures or standards, could be "'unusual and unexpected" in mod-
em air travel, and is certainly an abnormal aircraft operation. Of
course, whether it is the proximate cause of the injury would remain
undetermined."3
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PASSENGER
UPON PASSENGER ASSAULTS
The debate over the application and contours of an "accident" un-
der Article 17 also includes passenger upon passenger assaults.
Courts are split over whether such events are accidents absent some
causal connection to airline operation. At least one court has applied
a rigid application of Saks without elaboration, finding that such an
event is unexpected or unusual, thereby rendering the airline liable."
Most courts, however, have been hard pressed to find an intentional
assault by one passenger upon another to impose liability on the car-
382. See McDowell, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
383. See Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines, 8 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1993). In Sa-
karia, the passenger's flight landed shortly after a terrorist attack in the airport. See
id. Although there was death and carnage, the passenger was not directly exposed
to the aftermath of the attack. See id. Some time after meeting his party. however,
the passenger suffered a heart attack and died. See id. The court dismissed the
claim due to lack of evidence as to causation between the terrorist attack and the
passenger's heart attack and death. See id.
384. See Goodwin v. Air France, No. C97-1997. 1998 \VL 296356, at 1 ItN.D.
Cal. June 2, 1998) (holding that an attack by a passenger on another passenger can
be deemed an accident under the terms of the Warsaw Convention).
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rier under Warsaw. These courts have held that such episodes are not
inherent risks of air travel, or an incident derived from air travel.
In Price v. British Airways," a district court agreed with the
comments of Professor Goedhuis3 6 and found that a fistfight between
two passengers was not an accident relating to the operation of the
aircraft. It further stated: "To suggest that a fistfight between two
passengers is a characteristic risk of air travel is absurd. Such a fra-
cas is not a characteristic risk of air travel nor may carriers easily
guard against such air risk through the employment of protective se-
,,1387curity measures.
In Stone v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,' " the plaintiff claimed that
another passenger instigated a fight and punched him. The plaintiff
also alleged that the airlines "facilitated and/or participated [in]" the
incident by allowing the assailant to enter the first class compartment
without a proper ticket and failing to warn the plaintiff."9 The court
nonetheless agreed to dismiss the complaint holding that
"[p]laintiffs' misfortune allegedly occurred on the airplane, but was
not an accident derived from air travel. ' 3
Other jurisdictions have held that a carrier can be held liable
where it played a causal role in the assault. In Tsevas v. Delta Air-
lines, nc., 9' and Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc.,'9' the courts
385. No. 91 Civ. 4947, 1992 WL 170679, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1992) (holding
that situations in which a passenger is injured in a fight with another passenger
would not justify the carrier's liability by virtue of Article 17 because the accident,
which caused the damage, had no relation to the operation of the aircraft).
386. See id. (discussing Goedhuis' specific example of a passenger upon pas-
senger assault and finding that it "would be unjustifiable to declare the carrier li-
able by virtue of article 17, because the accident which caused the damage had no
relation with the operation of the aircraft."); GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 199-200.
387. Price, 1992 WL 170679, at *3; see also Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389
(6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a fight between two passengers is not an "accident"
within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention).
388. 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
389. See id. at 827.
390. Id.
391. 1997 WL 767278, at *4 (N.D. I11. Dec. 1, 1997) (finding that the assaults
and the resulting injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff were caused, at least
in part, by the carrier's actions in serving another passenger too much alcohol and
failing repeatedly to subdue said passenger or change the plaintiff's seat).
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found that the respective allegations were sufficient for the cases to
go forward where an assault by one passenger upon another passen-
ger was allegedly caused by over service of alcohol. In Tsevus, the
victimized passenger alleged that, prior to the assault, the assailant
was over served alcohol and that the flight attendants refused to
change the assaulted passenger's seat. ' Under these circumstances,
the unwanted advances, coupled with the refusal of attendants to in-
tervene, could constitute an unexpected event external to the passen-
ger94 because these events were beyond the usual and normal opera-
tions of the aircraft. "While a 'fight' between passengers may not
have a 'relation to the operation the aircraft,' service from flight at-
tendants, on the other hand, is characteristic of air travel and does
have such a "relation with the operation of the aircraft.""'
Similarly, in Langadinos, the First Circuit found a passenger's al-
legations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss when another pas-
senger had allegedly grabbed the plaintiff's private area and, prior to
the assault, was served alcohol despite his "'erratic" and "bizarre" be-
havior.396 The court, however, noted:
Of course, not every tort committed by a fellow passenger is a \Vara%
Convention accident. Where the airline personnel play no causal role in
the commission of the tort, courts have found no Warsaw accident. On the
flip side, courts have found Warsaw accidents where airline personnel
play a causal role in passenger-on-passenger torts.
392. 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that carrier's act of continuing to serve
alcohol to intoxicated passenger supported plaintiffs claim that the carrier played
a causal role in the assault).
393. See Tsevas, 1997 WL 767278, at *4 (determining that the carner's contin-
ued service of alcohol to a passenger while knowing that he 'as intoxicated, as
well as the numerous opportunities to prevent the assault upon the plaintiff, 'ere
sufficient to hold the carrier liable under the Warsaw Convention).
394. See id. (concluding that defendant's flight attendants failed to provide
service to the plaintiff which would have diffused the situation or allowed the air-
line's employees an opportunity to prevent the assault from occurring).
395. Id; cf Moses v. Air Afrique, 2000 WL 306853. at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,
2000) (alleging an assault in the baggage claim area by carrier employees to be
outside the scope of the Warsaw Convention).
396. See Langadinos v. American Airlines. Inc. 1)9 F.3d 68. 7 0 0ist Cir, 2000).
397. Id. at 71; see Husain v. Olympic Airways. 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121. 1134
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that "when a flight attendant's act creates a foreseeable
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A. WALLACE v. KOREAN AIRLINES
Despite these decisions, the Second Circuit recently held that a
passenger's sexual fondling of another passenger while she slept was
an accident under Article 17.'98 The court recognized the division in
the application of Saks3 99 between those cases requiring the "acci-
dent" to derive from "a risk characteristic of air travel" and those
courts requiring that only an unusual or unexpected event need be
shown.4° Under the latter approach, the court found that "an airline
presumably would be liable for all passenger injuries, including those
caused by co-passenger torts, regardless of whether they arose from a
characteristic risk of air travel. 40 '
The Wallace court also found that Saks did not address whether an
event must relate to air travel to be an Article 17 accident but, in-
stead, limited the issue of whether the event was related to a normal,
as opposed to abnormal, operation of an aircraft.402 The court avoided
this "Talmudic debate" as to whether "all co-passenger torts are nec-
essarily accidents for purposes of the Convention" by finding that,
under the facts presented, "the characteristics of air travel increased
[the claimant's] vulnerability to [the] assault. ' ,41" The court found that
the plaintiff was "cramped into a confined space beside two men she
did not know; the lights were turned down; the "sexual predator" was
left unsupervised in the dark, and the fondling "could not have been
five second procedures even for the nimblest of fingers," nor could it
"have been entirely inconspicuous.
A New York District Court recently followed Wallace in another
risk of injury to passenger, an 'accident' has occurred.").
398. See Wallace v. Korean Airlines, Inc., 214 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 2001 U.S. Lexis 1113 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2001) (holding that molestation
was an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention).
399. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 407 (1985) (discussing the division
between an inquiry into the nature of the event which caused the injury, and the
care taken by the airline to avert the injury).
400. See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 298.
401. Id. at 299.
402. See id. (stating that if the event on board an airplane is an ordinary, ex-
pected, and usual occurrence, then it cannot be considered an accident).
403. Id. at 299.
404. Id. at 299-300.
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passenger upon passenger assault. In Lallev v. Singapore Airlines,
Ltd., the Southern District of New York relied on Wallace, without
any reference to or analysis of the Convention's history or intention,
and found that the assault by one passenger upon another was an ac-
cident in that "the actions of the crew [were] not relevant to the de-
termination of whether the assault was an 'accident' because it is
clear that nothing in the term 'accident' suggests a requirement of
culpable conduct on the part of the airline crew.
These recent decisions are both troubling and ill-reasoned. First, to
some extent, the Second Circuit in Wallace ignores its own precedent
in Fishman where it held that an Article 17 accident required a con-
nection between the injury and abnormal operations."' Second, both
Wallace and Lahey conflict with the earlier First Circuit decision of
Langadinos, which held that a causal connection must exist between
the passenger's assault and the airline's involvement to constitute an
accident.O8 Third, the courts fail to reference or consider the negoti-
ating history of Article 17, throughout which the drafters reiterated
that the Article was not intended to encompass passenger upon pas-
senger torts, risks common to all carriers, or risks in every day life.
Finally, in Wallace, there was no basis for the "factual findings" of
the court. The parties agreed that the assault was not caused by any
405. See Lahey v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd.. 115 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466-67
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (following the Second Circuit's holding that an assault committed
by another passenger can be an accident under the Warsaw Convention).
406. Id. at 467. In Lahey, the passenger was sitting reclined in her seat when the
passenger behind her kept thrusting his knees or kicking from behind. See id. at
465. When the plaintiff complained to the flight attendants, the attendants offered
several solutions and provided both passengers the opportunity to change seats, yet
both passengers refused. See id. The flight supervisor advised the attendants to
"monitor the situation." See id. at 465. Sometime later, after meal service and
while the attendants were serving coffee, the passenger suddenly punched the
plaintiff, threw a food tray at her, and struck her on the side of the head with a
plastic entree dish. See id. at 466. The plaintiff suffered a laceration and the pas-
senger was arrested, at the plaintiff's request, upon arrival in Amsterdam. See ii.
Following a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff SlO,000 in compensation
and denied any reduction based on contributory negligence. See id. at 468.
407. See Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138. 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
408. See Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 72 (st Cir. 2000)
(stating that plaintiff's claim that flight attendants were rude to him does not affix
the carrier with causal responsibility for an assault).
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act or omission of the carrier and that the carrier was, or should have
been, on notice that the assaulting passenger was a problem or likely
to commit an assault.4 ° There was no evidence, however, as to how
long it took for the assailant to unbutton the passenger's pants and
briefly fondle her.410 Accordingly, there was no basis for the finding
that the assault "could not have been inconspicuous" or that the
"sexual predator was left unsupervised. 4 ' Such an assertion assumes
notice or knowledge to the carrier when the parties had already
agreed otherwise. Indeed, the court in Wallace made its findings as a• .411
matter of law on summary judgment. Moreover, in Saks, the High
Court cautioned "that any standard requiring courts to distinguish
causes that are 'accidents' from causes that are 'occurrences' re-
quires drawing a line, and we realize that reasonable [people] may
differ widely as to the place where the line should fall.,"4' Thus,
where there exists "contradictory evidence, it is for the trier of fact to
decide whether an accident ... caused the passenger's injury."4 It is
disturbing, then, that a court could find that a risk of an assault was
created by the airline simply because the plaintiff-passenger had two
other passengers whom she did not know sitting on either side of her
in a dimmed cabin. Neither a sleeping passenger in a dimmed cabin
nor three passengers seated next to each other constitute an abnormal
aircraft operation or a unique risk to air travel.
Wallace and other decisions not requiring a causal connection to
409. See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 300 (noting the undisputed fact that, for the entire
duration of the attack, not a single flight attendant noticed a problem).
410. See id. (opining that "these could not have been five-second procedures
even for the nimblest of fingers. Nor could they have been entirely inconspicu-
oIs.").
411. Id. at 299.
412. See Celutex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (emphasizing the
well-established rule that, on summary judgment requests, the Court is not to
weigh, assess credibility, or draw conclusions where reasonable minds might dif-
fer); Matsushita v. Elec. Indust. Co. Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see also Gabra
v. Egypt Air, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140395 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2000) (denying a
motion for summary judgment on whether a passenger's fall on a jetway was an
accident, leaving the issue to be resolved by a jury).
413. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985) (citing Schlesinger v. Wis-
consin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926)).
414. Id. at 405.
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aircraft operation are imposing a standard of liability far beyond the
duty imposed on other common carriers. The intent of the drafters
was to subject international carriers to "less rigorous" duties than
those placed upon the more established common carriers." Such car-
riers are not strictly or absolutely liable for assault or torts upon pas-
sengers by fellow passengers absent knowledge and inaction by the
carrier.4 1 6 This showing is required even though the common law
duty of care imposed on domestic carriers is considered to be a
"high" or "heightened" one."'
V. FAULT REVISITED AND OTHER
RUMINATIONS
While one objective of the new Convention is to maintain more
than sixty years of established precedent,"' this precedent remains
415. See GOEDHUIS, supra note 40. at 236.
416. See Kelley v. Metro N. Commuter R.R.. 37 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (S•D.N.Y.
1999) (holding that a railroad was not liable for employee's assault on a passenger
absent a showing that the railroad knew or should have known that the employee
was the type of person who might commit assault): Milone v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 91 F.3d 229. 231 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that, although
common carriers are not insurers against assaults, a duty arises when harm to pas-
sengers should have been foreseeable), Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453, 466 (3d
Cir. 1987) (stating that common carriers are liable it prior to the injury, the con-
duct of the offending parties indicated a disposition to engage in violent, harmful
behavior, thus giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of injury to others);
Johnston v. National Ry. Pas. Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5624 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.
25, 1997); Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463, 472 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining
that a duty of reasonable care imposed on a common carrier to protect passengers
from other travelers and the existence of an unruly crowd is only one factor to con-
sider); Curley v. AMR, Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998); Robinson %. North-
west Airlines, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 8237 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding common carrier
owes high duty of care but is not insurer of safety and negligence must be shown);
see also Lamkin v. Branniff Airlines, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D. Mass. 1994)
(affirming that a common carrier "is not an insurer of safety of its passengers nor is
it obliged by law to foresee and to guard against unlikely damages and improbable
harm."); O'Leary v. American Airlines. Inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (holding that an airline had a common law duty of care to protect
others from drunken passengers who get out of control).
417. See O'Leau3', 475 N.Y.S.2d at 286-87.
418. See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 62, pmbl. The Convention's
preamble provides as follows:
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION
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conflicted as to the meaning and application of "accident." More-
over, the term is likewise under pressure due to the Convention's ex-
clusivity, and the lack of any fault based defense to claims under
100,000 SDRs.
Arguably, the Montreal Convention of 1999's express adoption of
a pure negligence-based liability for claims over 100,000 SDRs, in-
stead of the prior concept of "all necessary measures," '" and the ex-
press reference to carrier exoneration for injuries caused by the con-
duct of third parties,4 0 evidences an intent to view passenger upon
RECOGNIZING the significant contribution of the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed in
Warsaw on 12 October 1929, hereinafter referred to as the "Warsaw Conven-
tion", and other related instruments to the harmonization of private interna-
tional air law;
RECOGNIZING the need to modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Conven-
tion an related instruments;
RECOGNIZING the importance of ensuring protection of the interests of
consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compen-
sation based on the principle of restitution;
REAFFIRMING the desirability of an orderly development of international
air transport operations and the smooth flow of passengers, baggage and
cargo in accordance with the principles and objective of the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on 7 December 1944;
CONVINCED that collective State action for further harmonization and codi-
fication of certain rules governing international carriage by air through a new
Convention is the most adequate means of achieving an equitable balance of
interests ...
See id.
419. See id. art. 21(l). Article 21(l) of the Montreal Convention provides: "For
damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit
its liability."
420. See id. art. 21(2)(a)-(b). Article 21(2)(a)-(b) of the Montreal Convention
provides:
The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of Arti-
cle 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that :
a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omis-
sion of the carrier or its servants or agents; or
b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or
omission of a third party.
See id.
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passenger torts as accidents, regardless of any complicity on the part
of the carrier. This is not overly persuasive, however, as the express
exoneration of carrier liability for "accident" caused by the "sole"
negligence of a third party was understood to be entirely directed at
aircraft related entities such as airline manufacturers and air traffic
controllers. This language does not diminish the original context and
meaning of "accident" at its adoption, nor would it obviate the need
that the injury producing event relate to an abnormal operation or
airline complicity in order to constitute an accident. A causal con-
nection to abnormal or nonstandard carrier operations does not nec-
essarily equate to fault.
The continuing uncertainty of Article 17's accident requirement is
largely due to the failure of modernization efforts to include "acci-
dent" in its "updating" of the Warsaw scheme. This raises the con-
tinuing question as to whether, in modem air travel, there should be
any need for monetary limits or elimination of fault based recovery.
Indeed, the monetary limits have long been and continue to be at-
tacked as unnecessary in modem air travel.'2' This is undoubtedly
true as the international aviation industry is no longer in need of spe-
cial protection and can readily obtain substantial insurance.
Perhaps the new Convention's failure to clarify that an "accident"
requires airline complicity or abnormal aircraft operations demon-
strates that such a limitation was not intended. This assertion, how-
ever, is highly speculative and simply inconsistent with the drafter's
intent, especially as to passenger upon passenger torts. By relying on
the virtual elimination of fault based exoneration, the reform efforts
simply by-pass the "accident" component, fail to appreciate that an
"accident" is not intended to extend beyond aircraft operations, and
fail to take into account the expansive interpretation of "accident" by
the courts.
To be sure, both the IATA and pending Montreal Convention
schemes have opted, without discussion, to maintain the no-fault li-
ability scheme first introduced through the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment for claims under 100,000 SDRs. The justification for the con-
421. See Bin Cheng, A New-Look Warsaw Convention on the Eve of the Twenty-
First Century, 22 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 45, 46-47 (1997) (observing that prac-
tically all the dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Convention stems from the amount
of limits imposed).
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tinuation of the no fault regime-aside from representing a trade-off
for monetary limits-is that it encourages quick, less expensive set-
tlements; reduces attorneys' fees; and reflects that airlines can best
distribute the loss among all passengersY." The concepts of risk dis-
tribution and deep pockets has its genesis in tort concepts that
emerged in the mid-20th century when many thought that tortious li-
ability was no longer cost effective.4 "2 Flowing from these concepts is
the view, espoused by some, that the Warsaw system "is to be an in-
strument of solace, not an opportunity for debate.
424
Certainly the notion that Warsaw should be an instrument of sol-
ace is appealing. Equally admirable is the desire to focus on compen-
sating victims of major accidents, speeding up the time between a
catastrophic airline accident and compensation, and reducing the
costs associated with obtaining deserved compensation. Nonetheless,
these issues are not as compelling when directed at passenger upon
passenger torts. For instance, the rationale of excessive litigation
costs is not particularly persuasive when, under the new scheme, the
sole issue for resolution will be damages, which does not necessarily
translate to lower costs or quicker settlements. Without risk of suf-
fering a no-liability finding, claimants will seek damage trials, have
little incentive to settle, and seek compensation beyond their true in-
juries. Carriers, in turn, will have little bargaining power. The elimi-
nation of fault based liability is not necessarily the answer to reduc-
ing costs; rather, the solution rests with such mechanisms as
expedited time-tables, mediation, arbitration, or other expeditious
dispute resolution mechanisms.
Fault based liability, in turn, does serve the practical and meaning-
ful ends of deterring claimants from presenting questionable or
meritless claims, "2 ' and protecting the public by improving safety and
422. See Nicolas Mateesco Maltee, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of
the U.S. Senate, 8 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 151, 164 (1983) (identifying various
interests behind the no fault system and the Warsaw Convention).
423. See Lowenfeld & Mendolsohn, supra note 3, at 598-99.
424. Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Spread of Tuberculosis in the Aircraft
Cabih-Issues ofAir Carrier Liabilit,, 27 TRANS. L.J. 41, 77 (2000).
425. See Orr, supra note 169, at 418 (noting that "the fact that fault has to be
proven deters the claimant from presenting claims without merit and encourages
compromise of claims of questionable liability.").
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security. 2 In the absence of at least a causal connection to abnormal
aircraft operations, ineffective or unresponsive airline service assis-
tance, or other airline complicity or involvement, the resulting abso-
lute liability standard places the carrier at the mercy of claimants and
renders it an absolute insurer. It is simply adverse to basic notions of
equality, justice, fairness, and moral responsibility to hold a carrier
absolutely liable for damages for passenger upon passenger assaults
or related torts. The degree of liability imposed is basic "to the pres-
ervation or loss of equal justice." 2 As one commentator noted:
The philosophy of the law has been progressive, keeping in pace with the
best interests of civilization. Let us encourage this sound progress which
maintains the balance of justice between all parties holding each account-
able for his own fault rather than arbitrarily imposing liability upon one
innocent party for the benefit of another who is quite arbitrarily set apart
as more deserving.4 E
Whatever value a no fault system is perceived to retain for major
international air disasters, that value is greatly reduced when applied
to attrition losses, such as passenger upon passenger torts or inten-
tional conduct. Such a system only encourages frivolous claims,
holds the carrier hostage to such claimants, and diminishes moral re-
sponsibility. Although carriers are, and should be, held to a high duty
of care, they should not be made absolute insurers for torts by and
between passengers.
CONCLUSION
The original Convention was intended as a limitation upon carrier
liability. As to personal injuries, delegates were concerned with
426. See Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Liability for Personal lnjurv and Death
Under the Warsaw Convention and Its Relevance to Fault Liabdli" in Tort Law, 2 1
ANNALs AIR & SPACE L. 1, 4 (1996) (citing L.S. Kriendler, The L.4TA Solution, in
14:21 LLOYD'S AVIATION LAw 4, 5 (1996)) (asserting that "the fault system is ex-
tremely important to the public. It is a public protection. It has improved av iation
safety and security.").
427. Orr, supra note 169, at 418-19 (stating that -im justice, the carrier should
assume the burden of using the highest degree of care. But in equal justice, the per-
son who chooses to use those services should assume those risks that are beyond
the bounds of due care.").
428. Seeid. at418.
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aviation accidents not everyday torts or injuries, and certainly not
passenger upon passenger assaults. The concerns at that time were
with major disasters and the potential devastating effect such events
could have on the infant international aviation industry. Indeed, vari-
ous comments by delegates throughout the course of the subsequent
protocols and conventions related to the Warsaw scheme specifically
indicate that "accident" was not intended to cover such incidents.
It is significant that the term "accident" was utilized with the tin-
derstanding that the carrier would not be liable where it was not at
fault. When the carrier's "due diligence" defense was first, and rather
hastily, eliminated by the Montreal Interim Agreement in 1966,
however, the term "accident" took on new significance. This signifi-
cance has only increased with the continued elimination of any fault
based defense (other than contributory negligence) for claims under
100,000 SDRs under both the IAA Intercarrier Agreement and the
Montreal Convention of 1999, the Convention's preemptive scope
over state or individual national law for any claims arising out of in-
ternational travel, and the ever growing number of international air
passengers. Despite modernization efforts culminating in the pending
Montreal Convention, no attention, clarification or "modernization,"
has been directed to the element of "accident" resulting in a diver-
gent and inconsistent application by the courts, especially as to pas-
senger disturbances, medical aid cases, and passenger torts.
The Saks decision fails to fully clarify the scope of "accident," es-
pecially as to whether there must be an unexpected or unusual air-
craft operation, or risk unique to air travel for carrier liability. Fur-
ther compounding the problem is the suggestion by the Supreme
Court in Tseng that an Article 17 accident encompasses a routine se-
curity search, even when the search is not unreasonable or contrary
to procedures.
The Second Circuit's recent decision in Wallace v. Korean Air-
lines is especially disconcerting, as it holds a carrier absolutely liable
for passenger upon passenger torts. In that case, the court strained to
find carrier complicity, taking the term "accident" far beyond its
original purpose or intention. The decision also places carrier liabil-
ity under a "risk" analysis, and grounds that liability on circum-
stances far beyond those which would be imposed upon other com-
mon carriers.
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It is certainly reasonable that the drafter's intended the Conven-
tion, like any legislation, to remain flexible in interpretation in order
to keep with changing times.42' It also cannot be ignored that modem
aviation is a far cry from what it was in 1929. The Convention's
original intention and framework, however, cannot be ignored."'
Neither the new liability limits, the two tier liability scheme, the ra-
tionale for the shift in the burden of proof, nor the Convention's ex-
clusivity, change the restricted understanding of "accident." Passen-
ger upon passenger torts, absent carrier involvement or complicity,
have no relation to aircraft operation, nor do they justify carrier li-
ability under Warsaw. Thus, injury claims arising out of standard
practices and operations of air travel, or those that arise out of risks
which are not unique to air travel, are not compensable.
Absent a textual amendment, in keeping with the purpose and ob-
jectives of the Convention, a proper analysis requires a determination
of: (1) whether the cause of the injury was an unusual or unexpected
event external to the passenger; (2) whether the event was an abnor-
mal operation of the aircraft; and (3) whether the event was the
proximate cause of the injury. The abnormal operation of the aircraft
element can be further evaluated by assessing whether the event con-
stituted a unique risk related to air travel. Until otherwise clarified
through express language in the Convention, this approach is con-
sistent with the limited nature of carrier liability, as well as with
429. See Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8. 10 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that the "drafters intended a flexible approach which would adapt to the
changing conditions of international air travel over the years."); see also
GOEDHUIS, supra note 40, at 36 (opining how -[l]ife always precedes law. Law can
thus adapt itself to the necessities of life and express its needs without cramping it
into the narrowness of laws too vigorous because premature"): Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting how the delegates at the War-
saw Convention drafted articles with the idea that they could be applied to meet the
changing needs of the aviation industry); Martinez Hemandez v. Air France, 545
F.2d 279, 284 (1st Cir. 1976) (observing that the drafting history does not deter-
mine the precise meaning of Article 17, but does illuminate the intention of the
Warsaw Convention drafters).
430. Cf Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 273
(1984) (documenting the fact that the Warsaw Convention's limitations on liability
for damage has not been altered in the past half-century). See generally Pigeon
River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd.. 291 U.S. 138,
160-61 (1934) (instructing that a treaty is to be construed in light of the conditions
and circumstances existing at the time it was drafted).
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modem concepts of liability under the Convention. While the ten-
dency of courts to improperly apply "accident" to passenger upon
passenger misconduct may be deemed by some as only a minor
glitch in the overall scheme of injury compensation for international
aviation claimants, it raises the fundamental question of whether
monetary limits and elimination of fault based concepts under the
Warsaw convention have continued vitality in modem air travel.
